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A Critical Reassessment of the Role of 
Neutrality in International Taxation 
David Elkins* 
Abstract: 
Neutrality plays a central role in the literature on international taxation. In its 
most prevalent form, the concept of neutrality posits that in order to maximize 
aggregate global welfare, capital needs to flow to where it would produce the 
highest pretax return. The thesis of this Article is that neutrality is ordinarily 
inapplicable in the field of international taxation. 
When considering neutrality in the international arena, the problem that one 
encounters is that the term “international taxation” is commonly used to 
describe a number of very different types of tax regimes (what the Article refers 
to as “intranational taxation,” “supranational taxation,” and “inter-
jurisdictional taxation”). Although the literature tends not to distinguish among 
them, the different types of international tax regimes are conceptually distinct 
and require radically dissimilar guiding principles. The Article argues that 
neutrality is an appropriate principle with regard to only one type of 
international taxation: a hypothetical non-Pigouvian supranational tax. With 
regard to intranational taxation, neutrality has no role to play, as a rational 
country will exploit its tax system to promote the welfare of its own constituents 
without regard to which investments it would have attracted in a no-tax world. 
With regard to a hypothetical Pigouvian supranational tax and in particular 
with regard to the much-scrutinized field of inter-jurisdictional taxation, 
neutrality is irrelevant, as here it is the after-tax return and not the pretax 
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return that is determinative of allocative efficiency. Promoting neutrality would 
undermine the very goals that the principle of neutrality purports to serve. 
The Article concludes by noting that the current discourse with regard to 
international taxation is fraught with conceptual confusion. First, there is a 
tendency to rely upon concepts that were developed within the context of 
domestic taxation without a thorough examination of their applicability to the 
international arena. Second, there is a tendency to lump together a number of 
very distinct types of tax regimes under the overbroad category of international 
taxation, and to ignore the fact that due to the fundamental dissimilarities 
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The concept of neutrality plays a central role in the literature on 
international taxation. In its most prevalent form, it posits that taxes should 
not be a factor in investment decisions.1 The underlying idea is that in order 
to maximize aggregate global welfare, capital needs to flow to where it is 
able to produce the highest pretax return. Consequently, when those 
investments that offer the highest pretax returns do not offer the highest 
after-tax return, capital will be misdirected. Therefore, allocative efficiency 
can only be achieved when alternative investments bear similar tax 
burdens.2 
                                                          
 1 The idea that taxes should not influence investment decisions is often referred to as 
capital export neutrality (CEN). CEN prescribes that capital should be subject to the same 
tax burden whether it is invested at home or abroad. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. HANNA, TAX 
POLICY IN A NUTSHELL 231 (2018); Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax 
Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014, 1043 (2012); STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON, 
PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 330-31 (2018); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], 
Are the Current Treaty Rules for Taxing Business Profits Appropriate for E-Commerce? 
Final Report, at 13 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/arethecurrenttreatyrulesfortaxing 
businessprofitsappropriatefore-commerce.htm. Although ordinarily stated terms of a two-
option scenario (home or abroad), CEN is actually a multiple-option scenario. It effectively 
requires that capital be subject to the same tax burden wherever it is invested. Other concepts 
of neutrality discussed in the literature include capital import neutrality (CIN) and capital 
ownership neutrality (CON). See, e.g., JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34115, 
REFORM OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ALTERNATIVES 5-10 (2010); CHARLES H. 
GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS 20-22 (4th ed. 2011); Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality: 
Reconsiderations, 27 VA. TAX REV. 203, 205 (2007). Under CIN, all capital invested in a 
particular jurisdiction should be subject to the same tax burden. CON requires that it be 
“impossible to increase output by trading capital ownership among investors.” Mihir A. 
Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT. TAX. J. 487, 495 
(2003). One prominent commentator has described the various types of neutrality as 
“alphabet soup” and has castigated the debate over which should guide international tax 
policy as a “battle of the acronyms.” DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 14 (2014). Nevertheless, CEN has dominated the international tax discourse and 
is the subject matter of this Article. 
 2 See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2000) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Crisis]; J. 
Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the 
International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 12-13, 
n.43 (2014); Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International 
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. 
REV. 261, 285 (2001), reprinted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 83 (2016); Yoram Keinan, The Case for Residency-Based 
Taxation of Financial Transactions in Developing Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 34-35 
(2008); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 569 (5th ed. 1989); Avi Nov, The “Bidding War” to Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REV. 835, 844 (2006); Oleksandr 
Pastukhov, International Taxation of Income Derived From Electronic Commerce: Current 
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A number of means have been suggested to help achieve this goal. 
One is for countries to tax the worldwide income of their individual 
residents and domestic corporations at the same rates (for the sake of 
convenience, I will refer both to individual residents and to domestic 
corporations as “residents”).3 When a taxpayer is faced with the same tax 
rate wherever it chooses to invest, then those investments that offer the 
highest pretax return will also offer the highest after-tax return. However, 
even when countries do impose tax on the worldwide income of their 
residents, those ostensibly subject to their home country’s tax regime can 
often escape – or at least defer – the payment of tax on their foreign income 
by operating abroad via foreign corporations or foreign subsidiaries.4 To 
combat such maneuvers, countries sometimes tax the foreign income not 
only of their residents but also of foreign corporations that are owned or 
controlled by residents.5 In fact, one of the proposals raised in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is that countries 
strengthen their Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) tax regime.6 
Another method that has been suggested for achieving neutrality in the 
international arena and which has been the focus of most of the literature in 
international taxation since the turn of the current century, is to harmonize 
                                                                                                                                      
Problems and Possible Solutions, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 310, 325-326 (2006); Adam H. 
Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens? 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 946-947 (2010); 
Shaheen, supra note 1, at 233; SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 114; Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-
Yonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal With Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV. 
533, 554 (2002). 
 3 See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic 
Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 698, 707 (2008); 
Edward Troup & Paul Hale, EU Initiatives on Tax Harmonization: Do as I Say, Not as I 
Do?, 17 TAX NOTES INT’L 1081, 1082 (1998). 
 4 Furthermore, corporations that are residents of high-tax countries can often expatriate 
and thereby escape their ex-home country’s tax regime. In the United States, because the 
criteria for determining corporate residency is place of incorporation, tax advisors have 
developed a number of techniques known as inversions, that effectively operate to convert a 
U.S.-registered corporation into a foreign-registered corporation. See, e.g., Steven Goldman, 
Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 71 (2008); GRAETZ, supra note 
2, at 321; Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1654-55 
(2013); DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, 
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 4-5 (2016); Adam H. 
Rosenzweig, Source as a Solution to Residence, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 471, 497 (2015); Joseph 
A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activities,” 33 
VA. TAX REV. 353, 354 (2013). 
 5 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 951 (controlled foreign corporations), 951A (global intangible 
low-taxed income), 954(c) (foreign personal holding company), 1297 (passive foreign 
investment company) (Westlaw 2017). 
 6 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Designing Effective Controlled 
Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 – 2015 Final Report (2015) [hereinafter OECD, Action 3], 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241152-en.pdf?expires=1557652675&id 
=id&accname=guest&checksum=8BFE625B1A05DF8CD7A77CD3A6DFFE14. 
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the tax regimes of the various countries, at least as far as the taxation of 
international investments is concerned. Again, if an investor faces similar 
tax burdens wherever it chooses to invest, then investment decisions will 
not be driven by tax forces and capital will flow to where it can produce the 
highest pretax return. The goal of neutralizing the effect of tax on 
investment decisions is one of the key justifications raised by the OECD for 
its campaign of combatting tax competition.7 
International tax scholars generally agree that pretax return is 
determinative of allocative efficiency and, furthermore, that when 
investment decisions are influenced by tax considerations the result is a 
misallocation of resources and a diminution of aggregate global welfare. 
True, not all scholars believe that it is appropriate for countries to cooperate 
in order to create a neutral international tax regime. Some contend that 
countries should pursue their own national interests even when it conflicts 
with broader global interests.8 Others hold that because it is impossible in 
practice to guarantee full cooperation by all countries and even a small 
number of non-conformers is enough to create distortions, countries are 
justified in pursuing their own narrow national interests.9 Nonetheless, even 
those who justify the pursuit of national interest in the design of tax regimes 
tend to accept the underlying proposition that there is an inherent conflict 
between national interest and global interest and that a neutral international 
tax regime, in which investment decisions are not influenced by tax 
considerations, would better promote global welfare.10 
This Article challenges that proposition. Its primary thesis is that, in 
most instances, allocative efficiency in the international arena requires that 
capital flows to the venue that offers the highest after-tax return. Attempts 
to neutralize the effects of taxation and to direct capital to those venues that 
offer the highest pretax return would, in most instances, produce allocative 
                                                          
 7 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A 
Retrospective After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783, 793 (2009); Yariv Brauner, An 
International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 263, 291, 294-97 (2003); 
Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future 
of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 151 (2009) (“The primary appeal of . . 
. harmonization is rooted in a concern for economic efficiency.”); GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 
320-23; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative 
Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377, 386, 389 (2008). 
 8 See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 108-09. 
 9 See, e.g., TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND 
COOPERATION, 58-59 (2018) (“[N]eutrality . . . cannot prevail absent cooperation among 
states. Significantly, all the efficiency arguments made by proponents of partial neutrality 
collapse without the cooperation of a large enough number of countries . . . In the current 
decentralized international tax regime, complete global neutrality is unattainable and partial 
neutrality highly doubtful. Thus, instead of pursuing the elusive goal of neutrality, states 
should pursue policies that support their national interests.”); see generally Mitchell Kane, 
Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 89 (2004). 
 10 See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 9, at 57-60; SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 114. 
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inefficiency to the detriment of aggregate global welfare. 
The differences between the domestic arena (where neutrality is 
usually, although not always, an important goal for policy-makers to 
pursue) and the international arena (where neutrality is usually, although 
not always, not only irrelevant as a principle of tax theory but would prove 
counterproductive if it could be achieved) are that the tax imposed by home 
countries on foreign residents is not really a tax, but rather a price of access 
to the host country’s territory; that the amount of tax that it can charge is 
determined by the supply of and demand for international investment and 
international investment venues; and that because the tax is part and parcel 
of the market mechanism, it is the relative after-tax return and not the 
relative pretax return that encapsulates allocative efficiency. 
The principle of neutrality was developed in the arena of domestic 
taxation, where the country is implicitly viewed as a closed economy 
without any contact with foreign persons, foreign investments, and foreign 
tax regimes. Part II presents the principle of neutrality as it applies in this 
arena. It explains how allocative efficiency requires that investments flow 
to where they can produce that highest pretax return and that when 
investments that offer the highest pretax return do not offer the highest 
after-tax return, capital is misdirected and societal welfare suffers. 
However, it also shows that even within the purely domestic arena, 
neutrality is not a universally applicable principle, as it does not apply to 
Pigouvian taxation. 
The question that arises then is whether the principle of neutrality is 
applicable to international taxation. However, in order to answer that 
question, we first need to explore what is meant by the term “international 
taxation.” Part III argues that the term is overbroad and is used to describe 
three very different types of tax regimes. The first (which I call 
“intranational taxation”) describes international aspects of a country’s 
domestic tax regime, including but not limited to, its taxation of non-
residents. The second (which I call “supranational taxation”) describes a 
hypothetical tax imposed by a supranational entity. The third (which I call 
“inter-jurisdictional taxation”) describes the coordination of various 
countries’ intranational tax regimes. Although the literature often confuses 
these three types of international tax regimes and refers to them 
indiscriminately as international taxation, clearly distinguishing among 
them is crucial, as the principles of tax theory that apply to each are very 
different. 
Part IV then explores the applicability of neutrality to each of these 
international tax regimes. Supranational taxation is the most similar to 
purely domestic taxation: neutrality would be an appropriate consideration 
with regard to supranational taxes, except for supranational Pigouvian 
taxes. With respect to intranational taxation, I will argue that the tax 
countries impose on non-residents is in substance not really a tax but rather 
a price of access to the host country’s territory. The goals of a host country 
Northwestern Journal of 
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in designing its intranational tax regime will include attracting beneficial 
investment, deterring detrimental investment, and maximizing the tax 
revenue collected from those investments that do occur. Within such 
framework, neutrality will not be a relevant concern. Moving to intra-
jurisdictional taxation, I will argue that whereas intranational taxation 
reflects the supply of and the demand for international investment and 
international investment venues, it constitutes part and parcel of the 
international market mechanism. Consequently, I will argue that from the 
perspective of global welfare, it is the after-tax return that indicates where 
resources are being used most efficiently. Any attempt to disrupt this 
process by neutralizing the effect of intranational taxation on investments 
will misdirect capital and create allocative inefficiency. 
Part V will summarize the findings and offer some concluding 
thoughts. 
II. NEUTRALITY IN DOMESTIC TAXATION 
The concept of neutrality was developed within the realm of purely 
domestic taxation, that is, where the country is a closed economy with no 
consideration given to foreign persons, foreign income, or foreign tax 
systems. Therefore, before we consider neutrality in international taxation 
we will explore its function in the purely domestic arena. Later, we will 
introduce international factors and examine how the principle of neutrality 
fares outside of the purely domestic arena. 
A. Non-Pigouvian Taxation 
The principle of neutrality proceeds from the presumption that the 
market is ordinarily an efficient means of allocating resources.11 The 
underlying idea is that if there exists a more efficient allocation of resources 
than the one that exists (i.e., if there is an alternative allocation in which at 
least one person is better-off and no one is worse-off), and if there are no 
regulatory or other impediments to their doing so, individuals and firms will 
exchange goods and services so as to realize the more efficient allocation. 
To take a simple example, if Adrienne values Bruce’s labor at $100 an hour 
and Bruce values his leisure at $80 an hour, it will be in the interest of both 
of them for Adrienne to pay Bruce, say, $90 an hour for his work. Such a 
transaction will constitute a Pareto improvement over the previous 
distribution.12 Under classic economic theory, individuals and firms will 
                                                          
 11 Absent this assumption, there would be no reason to attempt to preserve the pretax tax 
allocation of resources and to strive for neutrality in the tax system. An important exception 
to the applicability of the principle of neutrality in domestic taxation is Pigouvian taxation. 
See infra Part II.B. 
 12 A move from Distribution A to Distribution B constitutes a Pareto improvement if at 
least one person prefers Distribution B and no one prefers Distribution A. Vilfredo Pareto, 
Manuel d’Economie Politique, in A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES 1870-1929, 225 (T.W. 
Neutrality in International Taxation 
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continue to exchange goods and services until there is no possible exchange 
that makes anyone better without making someone else worse. At that 
point, the allocation of resources will satisfy the requirements of Pareto 
efficiency.13 
Taxation can disrupt this process by preventing efficiency-enhancing 
exchanges. To demonstrate, let us return to our example of Adrienne and 
Bruce, but now assume that the government imposes an income tax at the 
rate of 30%. The most that Adrienne would be willing to pay Bruce is $100. 
From Bruce’s perspective the best that Adrienne can offer is after-tax pay 
of $70, which is less than the value he places on his leisure. As there is no 
price which Adrienne would be willing to pay and which Bruce would be 
willing to accept, no deal will be consummated. Bruce will end up with 
leisure that he values at $80; Adrienne will end up without Bruce’s labor, 
which she values at $100, and the government will collect no tax. An 
opportunity to increase societal welfare will have been squandered.14 
This phenomenon is described in the economic literature as a 
deadweight loss.15 Deadweight loss is defined as the difference between the 
welfare cost imposed upon individuals by the tax and the amount of tax 
collected by the government.16 To demonstrate, if in our example the tax 
were only 6% and the wage rate remained $90 an hour, Bruce would suffer 
a $5.40 welfare loss (after-tax income of $84.60 versus non-taxed income 
of $90), and the government would collect $5.40 in taxes. The deadweight 
loss – the difference between Bruce’s welfare loss and the taxes collected 
by the government – would be $0. On the other hand, if the tax were 30% 
and consequently Adrienne did not end up hiring Bruce, Bruce would suffer 
                                                                                                                                      
Hutchinson ed. & trans., 1953). The text assumes that Adrienne’s hiring of Bruce entails no 
negative externalities or that any externalities are accounted for by appropriate Pigouvian 
taxation. See infra Part II.B. 
 13 Distribution A is Pareto efficient when there is no Distribution B such that 
Distribution B is a Pareto improvement over Distribution A. Pareto, supra note 12, at 225. In 
other words, a distribution is Pareto efficient when it is not possible to raise anyone’s 
welfare level without lowering someone else’s welfare level. 
 14 See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. 
L. REV. 919, 929 n.26 (1997); V. Patrice Wylly, Now You See it, Now You Don’t: 
Taxpayers’ Strategic Use of the Informal Job Market in Their Labor Responses to Effective 
Marginal Tax Rates Under the Earned Income Tax Credit, 37 VA. TAX REV. 109, 127 
(2017). 
 15 See, e.g., 1 RHONA C. FREE, 21ST CENTURY ECONOMICS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 
258-59 (2010); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market 
Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 61-62 (2011); Arnold C. Harberger, The 
Measurement of Waste, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 58, 59 (1964); N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 159-66 (4th ed. 2007). 
 16 See, e.g., Terrance O’Reilly, Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX 
REV. 583, 584 (2008); Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax 
Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 859, 864 (2002); David A. 
Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
1627, 1651 (1999). 
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a $10 welfare loss (he would have leisure worth $80 instead of $90 cash), 
Adrienne would suffer a $10 welfare loss (she would have $90 cash instead 
of labor worth $100), and the government would collect $0 in tax. The 
deadweight loss in this scenario would be $20. 
The principle of neutrality posits that the best types of taxes are those 
that least affect behavior and thus minimize the deadweight loss. For 
instance, the concept of neutrality is one of the ideas behind traditional tax 
reform, which seeks to lower the tax rate by broadening the base. The 
broader the base the more difficult it is to avoid the tax by changing one’s 
behavior, and the lower the rate the less incentive there is to avoid the tax 
by changing one’s behavior. In contrast, a high tax rate combined with a 
narrow base provides both the incentive and the opportunity to engage in 
tax avoidance.17 
In more technical terms, the principle of neutrality can be described by 
reference to the substitution effect and its impact on the marginal rate of 
transformation. In an efficient economy, the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) of one consumer good for another, of leisure for consumer goods, 
and of present consumption for future consumption will equal their 
marginal rate of transformation (MRT).18 Assume, for instance, that 
marginal consumers consider product P1 to be worth ten times as much as 
product P2 and consequently the price of P1 is ten times that of P2. Any 
factor of production that can produce more than ten times as much P2 as P1 
will be used to produce P2, while any factor of production that can produce 
less than ten times as much P2 as P1 will be used to produce P1. In other 
words, the MRS (as expressed by consumer preferences) of P1 for P2 will 
equal the MRT of P1 for P2. In such a state of affairs, resources are being 
used in their most efficient manner to satisfy consumer demand. 
Now assume that the government imposes an excise tax of 50% on P1. 
The price of P1 will now be fifteen times that of P2. Consumers for whom 
P1 is worth more than ten but less than fifteen times as much as P2 will now 
                                                          
 17 See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM G. GALE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 1 (1996); Gordon T. Butler, The One Fund Solution: “It’s My 
Money and I Need It Now!,” 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 262, 317 (2011); Michael J. Graetz, 
The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a “Flat-Rate” Tax, 
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 530 (1983); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX 
REV. 205, 215 (2012); Toru Morotomi, Japan’s Shift to Territoriality in 2009 and the Recent 
Corporate Tax Reform: A Japan-United States Comparison of Taxing Income From 
Multinationals, 14 PITT. TAX REV. 173, 177 (2017); Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be 
Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1200 (2017). 
 18 The rates of transformation of one consumer good for another, of leisure for consumer 
goods, and of present consumption for future consumption are prices, wages, and interest, 
respectively. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 2, at 61. See also David Aschauer & 
Jeremy Greenwood, A Further Exploration in the Theory of Exchange Rate Regimes, 91 J. 
OF POL. ECON. 868, 869-872 (1983); Robert E. Hall, Intertemporal Substitution in 
Consumption, 96 J. OF POL. ECON. 339, 341 (1988); Oscar Lange, The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics, 10 ECONOMETRICA 215, 217 (1942). 
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purchase P1 instead of P2.19 Such change is known as the substitution effect, 
the tendency to replace behavior that is subject to a relatively heavy tax 
burden with behavior that is subject to a relatively light tax burden.20 The 
increased demand for P2 and the decreased demand for P1 will cause the 
price of P2 to rise and the price of P1 to fall. Producers will respond by 
shifting to the production of P2 some factors of productions (land, labor, 
and so forth) that had been used to produce P1. As the supply of P2 
increases and the supply of P1 decreases, the price of P1 will rise and the 
price of P2 will fall. Eventually, a new equilibrium will be reached. This 
will occur, let us assume, when the pretax market price of P1 is eight times 
than of P2 and the post-tax price of P1 is twelve times that of P2. At that 
point, those factors of production that can produce more than eight times as 
much P2 as P1 will be used to produce P2, those factors of production that 
can produce less than eight times as much P2 as P1 will be used to produce 
P1, those consumers for whom P1 is worth more than twelve times as much 
as P2 will purchase P1, and those consumers for whom P1 is worth less than 
twelve times as much as P2 will purchase P2. In other words, the MRS (as 
expressed by consumer preferences) is 12:1, while the MRT is 8:1. Because 
of this discrepancy, the market is no longer operating efficiently: too few 
factors of production are being used to produce P1 and too many factors and 
being used to produce P2. Due to the tax, factors of production are no longer 
being used most efficiently to satisfy consumer demand. 
In contrast, assume that instead of imposing an excise tax on one 
product only, the government were to impose a tax on all consumer 
products, so that consumers are unable to avoid the tax by switching from 
one product to another. Because the relative demand for various consumer 
goods will remain the same as it was prior to the imposition of taxation, the 
relative prices of those goods will remain the same, and consequently there 
will be no incentive to move factors of production from one consumer good 
to another. If before the imposition of the tax, the MRS of the various goods 
                                                          
 19 The tax will not affect the behavior of consumers for whom P1 is worth less than ten 
times as much as P2, nor that of consumers who consider P1 to be worth more than fifteen 
times as much as P2. The former would have purchased P2 before the imposition of the tax 
and will continue to do so after the imposition of the tax; the latter would have purchased P1 
before the imposition of the excise and will continue to do so after the imposition of the tax. 
 20 Rosanne Altshuler, The Case for Fundamental Tax Reform, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 399, 400 (2012); DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 
OF THEORY TO POLICY 39 (9th ed. 2008); Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and 
Consumer Protection, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 218, 233 (2010); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, 
Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 4 (2011); Susannah Camic Tahk, 
Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2685 (2013); Binh 
Tran-Nam, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification: Some Conceptual Issues and a Preliminary 
Assessment, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 500 (1999); Susanah Camic Tahk, Public Choice Theory 
and Earmarked Taxes, 68 TAX L. REV. 755, 758-59 (2015); James P. Ziliak, Taxes and 
Labor Supply, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 235 (Joseph J. Cordes, 
Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle, eds., 2005). 
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equaled their MRT, the equilibrium will hold after the imposition of tax. To 
demonstrate, let us return to our previous example but now assume that P1 
and P2 are subject to the same rate of tax. Although the after-tax price of 
both products will rise, P1 will continue to cost ten times that of P2, factors 
of production that can produce more than ten times as much P2 as P1 will be 
used to produce P2, and factors of production that can produce less than ten 
times as much P2 as P1 will be used to produce P1. The MRS (as expressed 
by consumer preferences) of P1 for P2 and the MRT of P1 for P2 will each 
remain 10:1. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the broad-based tax is more neutral and thus 
more economically efficient than the narrow-based tax does not mean that 
the former is completely neutral and that it does not entail any deadweight 
loss. For instance, the higher prices of consumer goods following the 
imposition of tax could cause individuals to favor leisure over wages. Thus, 
while the tax may not affect the trade-off of one consumer good for another, 
it may affect the work/leisure trade-off and lead to inefficiency in the labor 
market (as in our previous example of Adrienne and Bruce).21 
The conclusion that when relative after-tax prices differ from relative 
pretax prices then factors of production will be used in an inefficient 
manner is relevant not only for consumer goods and for wages, but also for 
rates of return to capital investment. The effect of taxation on the relative 
return to capital investment will prove particularly significant for our 
discussion of neutrality in the context of international taxation. However, 
for the moment, we will continue to consider only the domestic arena. 
Investments exploit resources and produce goods. A higher rate of return 
indicates a greater capacity to transform economic resources into goods that 
consumers value. In a no-tax world, capital will thus tend to flow to those 
investments that most efficiently utilize resources. 
The introduction of taxation can disrupt this equilibrium. The key 
point here is that although efficiency is reflected in relative pretax returns, 
capital will flow to those investments with highest after-tax returns. If 
different types of investments are subject to differing tax burdens, then 
capital may be used in an inefficient manner. As an example, assume that 
the expected pretax return from investing in pharmaceutical research is 12% 
and that the expected pretax return from real estate development is 10%. 
                                                          
 21 The fact that consumer goods now cost more than they did before the imposition of 
the tax may cause individuals to work more so as to be able to afford the goods that they 
need. This phenomenon is known as the income effect. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX 
POLICY 76 (5th ed. 1987); Ziliak, supra note 20. From a statistical perspective, the income 
effect can mask the extent of the substitution effect. For example, an empirical observation 
that a broad-based tax on wages or on consumer goods does not affect labor supply does not 
justify the conclusion that there is no substitution effect and that the tax entail no deadweight 
loss. There might be a substantial substitution effect along with a substantial deadweight 
loss. All that one may reasonably conclude from the data is that the substitution effect equals 
the income effect. STEPHEN W. SMITH, LABOUR ECONOMICS 12 (1994); Ziliak, supra note 20 
at 235. 
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Assume further that the former is subject to a higher effective tax rate than 
is the latter, so that the expected after-tax returns are 7% and 9%, 
respectively. The discrepancy between the relative pretax returns and the 
relative after-tax returns will lead to underinvestment in pharmaceutical 
research and overinvestment in real estate development to the detriment of 
aggregate societal welfare. The principle of neutrality posits that it is only 
when the various investment alternatives are subject to the same rate of tax 
that the tax will not affect investor behavior and will not misdirect capital.22 
In our example, if investments in pharmaceutical research and investments 
in real estate development were both subject to an equivalent effective tax 
burden of, say, 40%, then the former would produce an after-tax return of 
7.2% and the latter would produce an after-tax return of 6%. As the after-
tax ranking is the same as the pretax ranking, the tax would not affect the 
ability of the market to direct resources to their most efficient uses. 
The principle of neutrality is probably the least controversial of the 
three traditional linchpins of domestic tax theory.23 Vertical equity – the 
idea that those who are better off should bear a greater tax burden than 
those who are not as well off – is the subject of vociferous philosophical 
and political debate. Not only are there those who disagree with the entire 
concept of redistribution,24 but even among those who do believe that 
redistribution of wealth is a legitimate aim of the tax system there is no 
confluence of opinion regarding the appropriate extent of redistribution. 
Horizontal equity – the idea that taxpayers who are equally well-off should 
bear equivalent tax burdens – may have strong intuitive appeal, but there is 
a serious doubt as to whether it has any cogent normative basis.25 In 
                                                          
 22 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do 
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 735, 739-40 (1979). 
 23 The three dominant motifs in modern tax theory are horizontal equity, vertical equity, 
and neutrality. See, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44 (2006); Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 5-7 (2013); Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative 
Field: Putting Critical Tax Scholarship in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (1998); 
Suellen M. Wolfe, Recovery from Halper: The Pain from Additions to Tax is Not the Sting of 
Punishment, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 161, 179-80 (1996). 
 24 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 283-305 (1985); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 40-44 (2d 
ed. 2007); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 802-07 (1998); 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974). 
 25 See generally, e.g., Elkins, supra note 23; Brain Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1323 (2008); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 
(1992); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX 
J. 139 (1989); Ira K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity, 
19 FLA. TAX REV. 79 (2016); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical 
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993); Richard A. 
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); Richard A. 
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990); James Repetti & 
Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012). 
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contrast, all would presumably agree that a tax that does not interfere with 
market incentives is preferable to one that discourages the effective use of 
resources. The only legitimate debate with regard to neutrality is how to 
rank it when it conflicts with some other goal of the tax system. For 
example, reasonable minds may well differ regarding the relative merits of 
two alternative tax regimes, one of which is less neutral but more vertically 
equitable than the other.26 However, it is incontrovertible that, all else being 
equal, taxes should be designed to be as neutral as possible. 
B. Pigouvian Taxation 
Our discussion of neutrality in domestic tax theory is subject to one 
important caveat. The principle of neutrality does not apply to Pigouvian 
taxation. Pigouvian taxes – named after the British economist Cecil Pigou 
who first proposed them in 1920 – are a means by which the government 
can attempt to overcome the problem of externalities, a phenomenon that 
can prevent the market from achieving an efficient allocation of resources.27 
Actions (or omissions) often impose costs on third parties. If the 
cumulative cost imposed on third parties is greater than the benefit that the 
parties to the action can themselves procure from their behavior, the 
consequence of individuals and firms pursuing their own self-interest will 
be a net reduction in total societal welfare. For example, assume that a firm 
is considering the construction of a noise-producing factory near a 
residential neighborhood. In making its decision, it will account for the cost 
of building and operating the factory and the income that the factory is 
expected to produce. It will have no economic incentive to consider the 
effect of the construction and operation of the factory on the welfare of its 
neighbors. Thus, if the income that the factory is expected to produce is 
greater than the costs that the firm expects to incur – including direct costs, 
time value of money, opportunity costs, and so forth – then the firm will 
likely go ahead and construct the factory. However, if the disturbance to the 
neighbors is greater than the benefit that the firm expects to procure – in 
economic terms, if the minimum amount that the neighbors would 
cumulatively agree to receive as compensation for being disturbed by the 
noise is greater than the amount that the firm would be willing to pay for 
the right to operate the factory – then the factory would bring about a net 
reduction of societal welfare. Externalities such as the noise pollution 
produced by the factory present a challenge to one of the primary 
                                                          
 26 Neutrality may also conflict with other principles besides those traditionally 
associated with tax theory. For example, Rawls rejected what economic and legal literature 
refer to as an endowment tax (and which Rawls called a “head tax”), a tax one of whose 
principal virtues is its respect for neutrality. His primary objection was that such a tax 
interferes with liberty. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 157-58 (Erin 
Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2003); John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 QUAR. J. OF 
ECON. 633, 654-55 (1974). 
 27 See A. C. PIGOU, M.A., THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1932). 
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justifications for reliance on the market to allocate resources: that 
individuals operating in their own best interests will cumulatively promote 
overall welfare.28 
One means by which the government can contend with this type of 
market failure is to prohibit or otherwise limit behavior that entails 
significant negative externalities. In our example, it might prohibit noise 
above a certain decibel level within a certain radius of residential 
neighborhoods. However, there are a number of problems with this 
approach. The first is that focusing on the externality – as government 
regulation tends to do, proscribing the behavior when the negative 
externality is great and permitting the behavior when the negative 
externality is small – misses the bigger picture. In order to ascertain the 
effect of the action of overall societal welfare, the government would need 
to assess not only the extent of the externality but also the expected benefit 
that the parties to the action expect to procure. If, and only if, the absolute 
value of the former is greater than the absolute value of the latter would 
prohibition be appropriate. In our example, if, and only if, the profits that 
the firm expects to earn are less than the cumulative discomfort experienced 
by the neighbors would it be appropriate to prohibit the construction or 
operation of the factory. Such fine-tuning is ordinarily beyond the capacity 
of non-tax regulation. Thus, a ban on activity that involves significant 
negative externalities would prevent that activity even in those cases in 
which the benefit is greater than the cost, and vice versa. A second problem 
with proscribe-or-permit regulation is that, even if it were possible to 
determine expected benefit and compare it to the expected externality, a 
finding that the benefit exceeds the cost and the action should therefore be 
permitted would involve distributive injustice as it would permit the 
enrichment of some at the expense of others. 
To overcome both the allocative and the distributive problems 
encountered by proscribe-or-permit regulation, Pigou proposed that the 
government should impose a tax that would quantify the negative 
externalities generated by the taxpayer’s behavior.29 Returning to our 
example, the government could impose a tax on those who produce noise in 
or near residential neighborhoods, scaling the tax to reflect the degree, the 
hour, and the duration of the noise and the number of individuals affected. 
The amount of the tax would ideally reflect the psychic cost imposed on the 
neighbors, that is, the amount that they would be willing to receive in 
exchange for bearing the noise pollution. If properly constructed, a 
                                                          
 28 Adam Smith, Of Restraints Upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of Such 
Goods as Can Be Produced at Home, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 347, 349 (1776) (“. . . [B]y directing that industry in such a manner as 
its produce may be of the greatest value, [every individual] intends only his own gain, and he 
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention.”). 
 29 See PIGOU, supra note 27, at 192. 
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Pigouvian tax would force market actors to internalize the externalities of 
their behavior and to determine on an individualized basis whether the 
benefit they hope to procure is worth the cost. Pursuing their own self-
interest, they would use communal resources if, and only if, the use of such 
resources would serve to promote overall societal welfare. No less 
importantly, those who do undertake such behavior would be forced to 
compensate the rest of society for their use of those communal resources.30 
Does the principle of neutrality have a role to play in the design of 
Pigouvian taxation? As we saw, the reasoning underlying the principle of 
neutrality is that (a) the market is an efficient allocator of resources, (b) 
taxes cause people to change their behavior as a way of avoiding the tax, (c) 
the substitution effect creates a deadweight loss that decreases social 
welfare, and (d) taxes should therefore be designed so as to limit the 
substitution effect. However, three of these four propositions are inaccurate 
with regard to Pigouvian taxation.31 Where externalities are present, the 
market is not an efficient allocator of resources. The Pigouvian tax is a 
means of overcoming this type of market failure by forcing the 
internalization of those externalities. Like other taxes, Pigouvian taxes 
encourage people to change their behavior. However, the fact that people 
will modify their behavior in light of the tax by opting for less heavily taxed 
courses of action over more heavily taxed courses of action than they would 
otherwise have chosen is hardly a censurable feature of Pigouvian taxation. 
On the contrary, a significant substitution effect indicates that the 
previously unaccounted-for externality constituted a serious impediment to 
achieving an efficient allocation. Thus, the more that a properly constituted 
Pigouvian tax induces behavior modification, the greater the justification 
for its enactment. In other words, a neutral Pigouvian tax is a contradiction 
in terms.32 
Focusing now on the rate of return from investment, we saw that with 
regard to non-Pigouvian taxation, it is the pretax return that determines 
efficiency. Consequently, when relative after-tax returns differ from relative 
pretax returns, capital will be misdirected. In the case of Pigouvian taxation, 
the opposite is true: it is the after-tax return, not the pretax return, that 
determines efficiency. For instance, assume that the firm constructing the 
factory in our previous example expects a return on investment of 15% and 
that constructing the factory in the best alternative venue would produce an 
                                                          
 30 Ideally, the government would make the affected neighbors economically whole by 
transferring to each a portion of the tax revenue. In the absence of direct transfer payments, 
members of the local population will receive indirect compensation as the government will 
be able to use the tax revenue to provide additional public services or to reduce their tax 
liability. 
 31 The only proposition that holds for Pigouvian taxation is (b). 
 32 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at 
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1048 (1992) (“. . . [A] 
Pigouvian tax . . . will not meet the traditional static distributive test of neutrality.”). 
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expected return of 12%. In a no-tax world, it would construct the factory 
near the residential population. Now assume that the government imposes a 
tax on noise pollution, that the tax properly quantifies the welfare loss by 
those affected by the noise, and that the tax reduces the expected return 
from a factory constructed need a residential neighborhood from 15% to 
10%. Although in a no-tax world the return on investment from 
constructing the factory near the residential neighborhood would be higher 
than in the best alternative venue, after the imposition of the tax, the return 
from the former would be less than the return from the latter. As what 
dictates firms’ behavior is the after-tax return on their investments, the firm 
in our scenario would presumably decide to construct the factory in the 
alternative venue. However, the fact that following the imposition of the tax 
the firm will choose a different course of action than it would have in the 
absence of taxation is hardly an indictment of the Pigouvian tax. 
Considering the welfare of everyone concerned – the neighbors, the firm’s 
stakeholders, the firm’s customers, and so forth – it is apparent that the 
alternative venue will better promote aggregate social welfare, and this fact 
is reflected in the greater after-tax return available from that venue. 
Summing up our brief discussion of neutrality in domestic taxation, we 
need to distinguish between non-Pigouvian and Pigouvian taxes. With 
regard to non-Pigouvian taxation, the pretax return reflects allocative 
efficiency, and neutrality is therefore a relevant principle in the design of 
non-Pigouvian taxes. With regard to Pigouvian taxation, it is not the pretax 
return but the after-tax return that is determinative of allocative efficiency. 
Consequently, the type of neutrality discussed here has no role to play in 
the design of Pigouvian taxes.33 
III. THE TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
Writers in the field of international taxation tend to rely upon the 
principle of neutrality without first examining whether it is applicable in the 
international context. For example, the OECD’s report on Harmful Tax 
Competition, a report that later served as the background for the OECD’s 
BEPS project, states that: 
. . . [T]he proposals set out in this Report, although not covering all 
aspects of tax competition, will further promote these objectives by 
reducing the distortionary influence of taxation…thereby promoting 
fair competition for real economic activities. If governments can 
agree that these location[al] decisions should be driven by economic 
considerations and not primarily by tax factors, this will help move 
toward[] the “level playing field” which is so essential to the 
                                                          
 33 The very classification of Pigouvian taxes as “taxes” is questionable. See infra Part 
IV.B. 
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continued expansion of global economic growth. 34  
In other words, in designing the international tax regime, we should 
strive to neutralize the effect of taxation on investment decisions so that 
capital can flow to its most productive venue. This assumption, which 
underlies much of the discourse in the field of international taxation, 
deserves to be examined critically. 
However, before we can do so, we need to clarify what is meant by 
international taxation. The problem here is that the literature employs the 
term international taxation as a catchall phrase to describe what are 
essentially a number of very distinct concepts. It is essential to distinguish 
among them, as each requires its own set of analytical tools. Principles that 
are appropriate to one of these concepts may be useless or 
counterproductive if applied to another. This is particularly true with regard 
to the principle of neutrality. Within the framework of one type of 
international tax regime, neutrality is a useful measure for promoting 
efficiency. Within the framework of another type of international tax 
regime, striving for neutrality would likely inhibit the achievement of an 
efficient allocation of resources. However, because commenters and 
policymakers refer indiscriminately to all types of international tax regimes 
under the overbroad category of international taxation, they tend to ignore 
the unique aspects of each and, in the name of promoting global welfare, to 
rely upon the principle of neutrality in instances when doing so would in 
fact be detrimental to global welfare. 
This Part will consider the three usages of the term ‘international 
taxation,’ usages that I will refer to as ‘intranational taxation,’ 
‘supranational taxation,’ and ‘inter-jurisdictional taxation.’ Part IV will then 
consider the neutrality principle in each type of international tax regime. 
A. Intranational Taxation 
One use of the term international taxation – what I will refer to as 
intranational taxation – describes the international scope of an individual 
jurisdiction’s tax laws.35 In the context of income taxation, whether to tax 
the foreign-source income of nonresident citizens36 and whether (and at 
                                                          
 34 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue, at 9 (1998), www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf. 
 35 See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, DIANE M. RING & YARIV BRAUNER, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 1 (4th ed. 2019). 
 36 Citizens of the United States, including those residing abroad, are liable for U.S. tax 
on their worldwide income. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines gross 
income as “all income from whatever source derived,” is not qualified with regard to the 
identity of the taxpayer or the geographical source of the income. Section 871 stipulates that, 
in the case of nonresident aliens, gross income includes only U.S.-source income (or income 
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States). 
Section 882(b) contains a similar provision with regard to foreign corporations. As neither of 
these sections applies to nonresident citizens, they are subject to the Section 61 default rule. 
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what rate) to tax the domestic-source income of nonresidents (or of 
nonresident aliens)37 are questions of intranational taxation. However, 
intranational taxation is not restricted to income taxation. Every tax must, 
explicitly or implicitly, provide rules for the international scope of the tax 
and must therefore possess an international tax regime. A property tax 
might apply to all property in the jurisdiction regardless of the residence of 
the property owner, or it might apply only to resident-owned property. A 
sales or purchase tax might apply to all sales of goods within the 
jurisdiction, or it might exempt sales or purchases by nonresidents (or by 
nonresidents who do not maintain a physical presence or an economic 
nexus within the jurisdiction).38 Furthermore, if residence is relevant, the 
law would need to determine who is to be considered a resident and who is 
to be considered a non-resident for the purpose of that particular tax. If the 
location of property or the place in which where property is sold is relevant, 
the law would need to determine the situs of property or the place of sale 
for the purpose of that particular tax, and so forth. The reason that I refer to 
this type of regime as intranational taxation is that the source of these rules 
is the domestic law of the taxing jurisdiction. 
The need for intranational tax rules is not premised on the existence or 
reach of other jurisdictions’ tax regimes. Even if no other country collected 
taxes, any legislation imposing taxes would, explicitly or implicitly, include 
an intranational tax regime. When other jurisdictions do impose taxes, and 
particularly when they impose taxes of a similar nature (e.g., on income, on 
property, or on sales), the jurisdiction concerned will need to consider the 
effects of the foreign tax on domestic tax liability. The spectrum of options 
for treating foreign tax liability is extraordinary broad. On the one extreme, 
the law may simply ignore the fact that other jurisdictions impose taxes. On 
the other extreme, it may provide a complete exemption any time a foreign 
jurisdiction imposes taxes. More moderate – and more common – responses 
                                                                                                                                      
See I.R.C., §§ 61, 871, 882(b) (Westlaw 2017). JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 9 (3d ed. 2010). The United States taxes the foreign-source income of non-
resident aliens. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. 
REV. 483, 487-90 (2004). For discussion of the appropriateness of taxing nonresident 
citizens, see Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: 
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117 (2014); Michael S. Kirsch, 
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (2007); Ruth Mason, 
Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016); Bernard Schneider, The End of 
Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2012); 
Daniel Shaviro, Taxing Potential Members’ Foreign Source Income, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625732 (2015); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 1289 (2010). 
 37 See I.R.C. §§ 871-72 (non-resident aliens) (Westlaw 2017); Id. at §§ 881-82 (foreign 
corporations) (Westlaw 2017). 
 38 For the constitutionality of states imposing sales tax on nonresident vendors, see 
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018), overruling Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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include a credit or a deduction for foreign taxes.39 
Note that, because the rules of intranational taxation vary from one 
jurisdiction to another and from one tax to another, the term intranational 
taxation is devoid of substantive meaning without the name of a jurisdiction 
and a tax attached to it. For instance, the question ‘What are the 
intranational tax rules of Canadian income tax (or of Brazilian property 
tax)?’ admits of an answer. The question ‘What are the rules of 
intranational taxation?’ does not.40 
A further distinction that we need to make within the context of 
intranational taxation is between the taxation of residents on their foreign 
property or foreign economic activity on the one hand and the taxation of 
nonresidents on their domestic property or domestic economic activity on 
the other. In the context of income taxation, these two categories of tax are 
often referred to as “outbound” and “inbound,” respectively.41 Adopting 
that terminology, one may refer to the imposition of tax by a country on the 
foreign property or foreign economic activity of its residents as “outbound 
intranational taxation” and to the imposition of tax by a country on the 
domestic property or economic activity of nonresidents as “inbound 
intranational taxation.” In the discussion that follows, I will focus primarily 
on the taxation that countries impose on the economic activity of non-
residents. Thus, the term intranational taxation, unless otherwise specified, 
refers to inbound intranational taxation. 
B. Supranational Taxation 
The term international taxation is also used to describe a tax that is 
imposed not by an individual jurisdiction, but by a supranational entity. I 
will refer to this type of tax as supranational taxation. The purest case of 
supranational taxation would be tax imposed by a hypothetical global 
                                                          
 39 The United States ordinarily provides a credit for foreign income taxes paid. I.R.C. § 
901 (Westlaw 2017). The OECD model treaty recognizes both the exemption method and 
the credit method. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Model Tax Convention on 
income and on Capital, at 376-406 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-
convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en#page1. 
 40 On its own, the term intranational taxation does have formal meaning. As described in 
the text, the term denoted the rules adopted by a jurisdiction to determine the international 
scope of a particular tax. It has no substantive meaning as the rules vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and from tax to tax. For a discussion of the difference between substantive or 
concrete rules and formal rules, see CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE 
PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 15 (John Petrie trans., 1963) (“The question is to find a formula of 
justice which is common to the different conceptions we have analysed. This formula must 
contain an indeterminate element—what in mathematics is called a variable—the 
determination of which will give now one, now another, conception of justice. The common 
idea will constitute a definition of formal or abstract justice. Each particular or concrete 
formula of justice will constitute one of the innumerable values of formal justice”) 
(emphases in the original). 
 41 ISENBERGH, supra note 36, at 4. 
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government in a world in which individual countries did not exist.42 Less 
extreme examples of a supranational tax – also hitherto unimplemented but 
whose adoption is presumably more likely than is the dissolution of 
individual countries and the emergence of a world government – include 
proposals for taxing electronic commerce, foreign-exchange markets, and 
carbon emissions.43 
Needless to say, in practice supranational taxes are rare. One 
conceptually controversial example of supranational taxation might be 
those taxes collected by the European Union. Under the relevant provisions 
of EU law, the EU receives custom duties from goods entering the EU, a 
percentage of each member state’s gross national income, and a portion of 
the value added tax collected by each member state.44 However, the 
classification of EU taxes as supranational is problematic. It is arguable that 
the EU should not be viewed as a supranational entity but rather as 
something more akin to a weak federal (or confederal) state.45 From this 
perspective, the distribution of tax revenue between the EU and its member 
states and the collection of tax on goods entering the territory of the EU 
would not be examples of supranational taxation, but simply facets of 
European domestic taxation.46 
Perhaps a better example of an existing supranational tax would be the 
                                                          
 42 See, e.g., 2 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF 
THE JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 287 (1884) (proposing a 
supranational tax to fund an international body with powers resembling those of a global 
federated state). 
 43 See, e.g., TONY ADDISON, GEORGE MAVROTAS & MARK MCGILLIVRAY, WORLD INST. 
FOR DEV. ECON. RES., DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: EVIDENCE 
AND GLOBAL POLICY AGENDAS, at 11-13 (2005); Rifat Azam, Global Taxation of Cross-
Border E-Commerce Income, 31 VA. TAX REV. 639 (2012); Bernard P. Herber & Jose T. 
Raga, An International Carbon Tax to Combat Global Warming: An Economic and Political 
Analysis of the European Union Proposal, 54 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOL. 257 (1995); U.N. 
DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY 2012: IN SEARCH OF 
NEW DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.C.1 (2012). 
 44 European Parliamentary Research Service, Own Resources of the European Union: 
Reforming the EU’s Financing System, at 2 (Nov. 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630265/EPRSBRI(2018)630265_EN.pdf. 
 45 MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: THE BUILDING OF EUROPE, 
1950-2000 49 (2000) (“Our theoretical analysis suggests that the EC/EU is neither a 
federation nor a confederation in the classic sense. But it does claim that the European 
political and economic elites have shaped and moulded [sic] the EC/EU into a new form of 
international organization, namely a species of ‘new’ confederation.”); Jean Michel Josselin 
& Alain Marciano, The Political Economy of European Federalism 3-4 (Ctr. For Res. In 
Econ. & Mgmt., Pub. Econ. & Soc. Choice Working Paper WP 2006-07, 2006), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080819213748/http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2006/ie-
200607.pdf (“[T]he European Union is mainly a confederation but it already contains 
elements of a federation.”). 
 46 It is not even an issue of intranational taxation as its primary concern is not the 
international scope of European tax law, but rather the distribution of tax revenue between 
the two levels of government. 
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dues paid by member states to the United Nations. Under the arrangements 
currently in force, dues are calculated as a function of the country’s gross 
national product and then adjusted to reflect per capita income and external 
debt.47 While described as ‘dues’ and theoretically voluntary (as they apply 
only to member states) that are members of the international body, both the 
fact that refraining from membership in the UN may not be a practical 
option48 and the formula by which the dues are calculated mean that these 
dues are least very similar to, and in many ways effectively function as, a 
supranational tax. 
While supranational taxes are rare, if they exist at all, defining the 
term, understanding the nature of supranational tax, and distinguishing 
between supranational taxation and other types of taxes that are commonly 
grouped together under the heading of international taxation, is important 
for our discussion. When discussing intranational taxation (or inter-
jurisdictional tax, a term that will be defined shortly), the literature tends to 
apply the norms and principles that rationally should apply to supranational 
taxation but that are inappropriate with regard to intranational or to inter-
jurisdictional taxation. Identifying and understanding the concept of 
supranational taxation, the principles that would apply to it were it to exist, 
and why those principles would apply will help clarify which principles are 
and which principles are not relevant with respect to intranational and inter-
jurisdictional taxation. 
C. Inter-jurisdictional Taxation 
A third sense of the term international taxation, which I will refer to as 
inter-jurisdictional taxation, involves attempts by countries to coordinate 
their intranational tax regimes. In the early to mid-twentieth century, the 
focus of inter-jurisdictional taxation was the prevention of double taxation, 
the imposition of tax on the same income by a number of jurisdictions.49 
                                                          
 47 In any case, no country will contribute more than 22% or less than 0.001% of the 
United Nation’s budget. G.A. Res. 73/271, ¶¶ 6 (f), (h) (Dec. 22, 2018); Rakesh Dubbudu, 
How Much Do Various Counties Contribute to the UN Budget? FACTLY (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://factly.in/united-nations-budget-contributions-by-member-countries/. 
 48 Even perennially neutral Switzerland finally joined the United Nations in 2002. Rory 
Carroll, Switzerland Decides to Join UN, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2002), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/04/unitednations (Switzerland’s referendum 
on joining the United Nation “billed as a battle for the country’s soul.”). 
 49 See REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION SUBMITTED TO THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY PROFESSORS BRUINS, EINAUDI, SELIGMAN AND SIR JOSIAH STAMP 
(1923), reprinted in 4 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED 
STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 4003 (1962) [hereinafter League of Nation’s Report on Double 
Taxation]. See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION 
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (1977) [hereinafter OECD 1977 Model Convention on 
Double Taxation], https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-double-taxation-convention-
on-income-and-capital_9789264055919-en#page1. In addition to the fact that the later 
document’s title refers explicitly and exclusively to “double taxation,” it also proposes the 
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One motivation for such efforts was a fear that the threat of double taxation 
would inhibit the development of international trade.50 By the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries, the focus of inter-jurisdictional taxation 
had shifted from preventing double taxation to preventing what the OECD 
refers to as “double non-taxation,” the phenomenon of multi-national 
corporations not paying tax in any jurisdiction or bearing an extraordinarily 
low overall tax burden.51 The OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) is one example of an attempt to forge an inter-
jurisdictional tax regime.52 
It is important to distinguish between the branch of law to which inter-
jurisdictional taxation belongs and the subject matter of inter-jurisdictional 
taxation. From the perspective of the legal norms to which it conforms, 
inter-jurisdictional taxation belongs to the field of public international law. 
For instance, the primary means by which countries coordinate their 
intranational tax regimes is by entering into bilateral or, more rarely, multi-
national tax treaties.53 As international treaties, tax treaties are part of 
                                                                                                                                      
following as a title for treaties executed between nations and based on the model language: 
“Convention between (State A) and (State B) for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital.” Id. at 1, 23. 
 50 See League of Nation’s Report on Double Taxation, supra note 49, at 4009-21. 
 51 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Crisis, supra note 2; Rifat Azam, Minimum Global Effective 
Corporate Tax Rate as General Anti-Avoidance Rule, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 4, 49 (2017); 
Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1307, 1318-
19 (2013); Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises By 
Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 
619, 626-32 (2009); Jasmine M. Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 338, 342 (2014); GRAETZ, supra note 2; 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FL. TAX REV. 699 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, 
The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2012); Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine 
Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will it Last? Will it Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 37 (2003); Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand Unified Global Income 
Tax, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 361 (2013). See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 
(2017). As opposed to the 1977 model, see OECD 1977 Model Convention on Double 
Taxation, supra note 49, the title of the 2017 convention does not include the term “double 
taxation” and adopts instead the more neutral phraseology, “with respect to taxes.” More 
significantly, the 2017 model proposes as a title for bilateral treaties, “Convention between 
(State A) and (State B) for the Elimination of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital and the Prevention of Tax Evasion and Avoidance” (emphasis 
added). ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO 
TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL 27 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-
convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en#page28. 
 52 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN OF BASE 
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf; Org. for 




 53 There are currently more than 2,000 international tax treaties in force. AVI-YONAH ET 
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conventional international law and are consequently subject to the rules that 
govern the validity, form, and interpretation of international treaties.54 In 
the context of U.S. constitutional law, treaties, once ratified by the Senate, 
have the status of statutory law.55 Conflicts between treaties and other 
legislation are resolved in accordance with the ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation and in particular the rule that when two statutes conflict, the 
provision enacted later in time prevails.56 This rule is the source of 
Congress’ constitutional authority to override treaty provisions through 
subsequent legislation.57 While a legislative override constitutes a violation 
of a conventional obligation undertaken by the United States and is 
expressly prohibited by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,58 
for the purpose of U.S. domestic law, the override is effective.59 
Another example of how inter-jurisdictional taxation belongs to the 
field of the international law is the question of whether the common 
practice of taxing the worldwide income of residents and the domestic-
source income of nonresidents is simply a matter of international usage or 
has acquired the status of customary international law. In accordance with 
the rules of international law, the answer depends upon whether countries 
refrain from taxing the foreign-source income of nonresidents because of 
the belief that customary international law prohibits them from doing so. If 
it can be shown that countries refraining from taxing foreign-source income 
are motivated by such a belief, then the practice would constitute customary 
international law and states would be precluded under international law 
from taxing the foreign-source income of foreigners. If those countries are 
not motivated by such a belief, then taxing the foreign-source income of 
foreign residents, while perhaps unusual and at variance from international 
                                                                                                                                      
AL., supra note 35, at 1. 
 54 See, e.g., Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX & 
BUS. L. 1 (1986). 
 55 U.S. CONST., art. VI. 
 56 See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 
U.S. 190, 195 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). 
 57 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 112 U.S. at 600. 
 58 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty.”). The Vienna Convention is considered a declarative treaty (codifying 
pre-existing customary international law). Consequently, even countries – such as the United 
States – that are not parties to the convention are nonetheless bound by its terms. See also, 
e.g., Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 1980 Digest § 7, at 1041, n.43, cited in Andrew M. 
Beato, Newly Independent and Separating States’ Succession to Treaties: Considerations on 
the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 9 AM U.J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y, 525, 533 n.31 (1994) (the United States government considers the Vienna 
Convention “declarative of customary international law”). 
 59 I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (Westlaw 2017) (“For purposes of determining the relationship 
between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue, neither 
the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law.”). 
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usage, would not constitute a violation of international customary law. 60 
However, for the purpose of our discussion, what is important is not 
the form but rather the content of inter-jurisdictional taxation. While inter-
jurisdictional taxation is a branch of international law, its subject matter is 
the regulation and co-ordination of the various countries’ intranational tax 
regimes. 
D. The Substance of Semantics 
As already noted, the literature in the field of international taxation 
tends to employ the term international taxation indiscriminately to refer to 
intranational taxation, supranational taxation, and inter-jurisdictional 
taxation. The common attribute of these three concepts is that they are all 
concerned with international aspects of taxation. In other words, in a world 
in which persons, capital, goods, and services did not cross borders, there 
would be no practical need for intranational or inter-jurisdictional taxation 
and the chance that any sort of supranational tax would be adopted would 
be even more remote than it is in our world.61 It is only because countries 
are not isolated entities that it is necessary to delineate the international 
reach of a country’s tax regime, attempt to coordinate individual countries’ 
tax regimes, and consider the possibility that a supranational tax regime is 
even fathomable.62 
However, these similarities are largely superficial. In substance, 
intranational taxation, inter-jurisdictional taxation, and supranational 
taxation are fundamentally different concepts. One particularly significant 
way in which they differ is the degree to which neutrality – developed 
within the framework of domestic taxation – is a proper goal of the tax 
systems. The failure to distinguish among these three very different 
                                                          
 60 See, e.g., Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 
L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 148 n.23 (1998); H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. 
Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX 
L. REV. 137, 166 (2000); see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Does Customary 
International Tax Law Exist? L. & Econ. Working Papers (2019), 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1271&context=law_econ_curr
ent; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., To What Degree Does Customary International Law Require 
Accommodation of a Source Country’s Right to Tax High, Tax Low or Not Tax at All?, in A 
COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMERITUS PROFESSOR GABRIËL A. 
MOENS (Augusto Zimmermann ed., 2018). 
 61 Although anachronistic, this model of a closed society forms the basis of much 
contemporary social philosophy. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 577 (1996) 
(“This fundamental relation of citizenship has two special features: first, it is relation of 
citizens within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter only by birth and exit only 
by death . . . .”). 
 62 Even social philosophers who support the concept of international distributive justice 
tend to accept that the norms of distributive justice would not apply if countries were indeed 
closed systems. See, e.g. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 136-169 (1979); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 240 (1989). 
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concepts has led both scholars and policy-makers to attempt to apply the 
principle of neutrality in an inappropriate manner and is one of the sources 
of the incoherence prevalent in the current discourse on international 
taxation. 
IV. NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
Part II analyzed the principle of neutrality as it applies in the domestic 
arena. Part III described the three types of tax regimes commonly grouped 
together under the overbroad title of international taxation. This Part will 
consider whether the principle of neutrality as developed in the context of 
domestic taxation is applicable in the international arena. 
As one might expect, we will discover that there is no monolithic 
answer to this question. Because the different types of international tax 
regimes are conceptually distinct, the principles appropriate to each will 
also differ. 
A. Supranational Taxation 
For the purpose of our discussion, the existence or even the political 
and practical feasibility of a supranational regime is not particularly 
relevant. The importance of discussing the role that neutrality would play in 
such a regime is not that one is likely to be adopted in the foreseeable 
future, but rather to compare and contrast the role of neutrality in a 
supranational tax regime with its role in either an intranational tax and 
inter-jurisdictional tax regime. The literature – which indiscriminately 
includes all three regimes within the single catchall phrase international 
taxation – tends to apply principles to intranational and to inter-
jurisdictional tax regimes that are inappropriate, but would be appropriate 
to a supranational tax regime. By analyzing how neutrality would apply to a 
supranational regime, we will be better able to discern why it is 
inapplicable to intranational and inter-jurisdictional regimes. 
As a rule, the principles of tax theory as they were developed in the 
purely domestic arena would (or should) provide appropriate guidance for 
the framers of a supranational tax regime. The reason that domestic tax 
theory is applicable in the supranational context is that purely domestic 
taxation and supranational taxation share the same theoretical background 
conditions. In each case, the implicit context is a closed economic system 
with a tax regime that is not in competition with other tax systems. More 
significantly, in each case, the taxing authority owes a fiduciary duty to the 
taxpaying public: the taxing authority has no legitimate independent desire 
for tax revenue other than what is necessary to promote the welfare of the 
taxpaying public itself.63 In other words, if the theory of purely domestic 
                                                          
 63 The fiduciary duty of domestic and supranational taxing authorities vis-à-vis the 
taxpaying public is explained in more depth in our discussion of intranational taxation, see 
infra subpart B. 
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taxation concerns the principles of taxation that would apply to an ‘island 
country,’ then the theory of supranational taxation concerns the principles 
of taxation that would apply to an ‘island planet.’ The only difference 
between purely domestic taxation and supranational taxation is the size of 
the relevant jurisdiction. 
Consider a supranational entity charged with raising funds, say for the 
purpose of supplying international public goods or redistributing global 
wealth. In designing the structure of its tax system, the supranational entity, 
like its domestic counterpart, would need to consider the possible economic 
side effects of any tax it imposed. Specifically, as in the domestic context, 
the tax would likely induce taxpayers to change their behavior, and the 
resulting deadweight loss would reduce aggregate global welfare.64 This 
would most clearly be the case if those subject to the supranational tax were 
individuals and private firms (their response to a supranational tax would be 
similar to their response to a similarly constituted domestic tax). It would 
also hold if those subject to the tax were countries. For example, suppose 
that the supranational entity was to impose on each country a tax equal to a 
percentage of its government’s annual budget. The result would be that the 
cost to a country of supplying domestic public goods or of redistributing 
domestic wealth would be greater than in the absence of the supranational 
taxation. If the supranational tax rate were substantial enough, countries 
might reduce the goods that they supply their residents and lessen their 
domestic redistributive efforts. For instance, assume that a country is 
considering imposing a tax of $1 billion on its residents in order to fund 
investment in its infrastructure. It calculates that the aggregate benefit that 
its residents would derive from such investment is greater than $1 billion. 
However, implementing the project would increase its national budget by 
$1 billion and would therefore subject it to additional supranational taxation 
of $1 billion times the tax rate. If, after factoring in the additional 
supranational tax, the cost turns out to be greater than the benefit, the 
project would likely be abandoned. The deadweight loss is the difference 
between the benefit that residents would have derived from the project and 
the cost of the project in the absence of supranational tax. 
Like in the domestic arena, the principle of neutrality posits that the 
supranational taxing entity designs its taxes so as minimize the substitution 
effect and the consequent deadweight loss. For example, again assuming 
that those subject to the tax are countries and not individuals or private 
firms, using the country’s GNP as a tax base instead of its national budget 
may better conform to the principle of neutrality.65 It is reasonable to 
assume that countries would be less likely to refrain from permitting their 
                                                          
 64 See supra Part II.A. 
 65 GNP, or gross national product, is the market value of all goods and services 
produced during a specific time period. See, e.g., JAMES D. GWARTNEY, RICHARD L. STROUP, 
RUSSELL S. SOBEL & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, MACROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE 107-08 (2014). 
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GNP to grow in response to a supranational tax than to refrain from 
increasing their budget. 
A further parallel between domestic taxation and supra-national 
taxation is that in both instances, the principle of neutrality is applicable 
only to non-Pigouvian taxes. The primary goal of Pigouvian taxation is to 
induce market actors to refrain from behavior whose social cost is greater 
than the benefit that they expect to derive therefrom.66 Therefore, the fact 
that taxpayers change their behavior in response to Pigouvian taxation is a 
positive, not a negative, feature of the tax. For example, a well-designed 
supra-national tax on greenhouse gas emissions would effectively limit the 
emission of greenhouse gasses to those instances in which the benefit of 
emitting the gas is greater than the cost imposed on the global community.67 
The fact that market actors would change their behavior and reduce their 
emission of greenhouse gasses is not an unfortunate side effect that the 
framers of the tax would need to minimize to the extent possible, but rather 
the successful realization of its stated objective.68 
B. Intranational Taxation 
In order to determine the role, if any, of neutrality in intranational 
taxation, we first need to discuss the nature of intranational taxation and the 
relationship between the host country and those subject to its intranational 
tax regime. Only then we will be in a position to consider the principles that 
would guide the host country in designing its intranational tax regime and, 
specifically, whether neutrality would have a role to play in that regard. 
Intranational taxation (i.e., the tax imposed on non-residents who 
engage in economic activity in the territory of the host country)69 is in 
substance not really a tax. True, it does meet the formal definition of a tax. 
As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, a “tax” is “[a] charge, usu. 
monetary, imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or 
property to yield public revenue.”70 
                                                          
 66 See PIGOU, supra note 27, at 192. 
 67 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate 
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a 
Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global 
Environment Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 786 
(1999). 
 68 See McCaffery, supra note 32, at 1048, and the accompanying text. 
 69 See supra Part III.A for a discussion of limiting the scope of this term for the purpose 
of this article. 
 70 Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See also Tax, OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF ENGLISH (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“A compulsory contribution to state 
revenue, levied by the government on workers’ income and business profits, or added to the 
cost of some goods, services, and transactions.”); Tax, MERRIAM WEBSTER.COM, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tax (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (“[A] charge 
usually of money imposed by authority on persons or property for public purposes.”). 
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Indeed, the tax imposed by a host country on foreign residents is (a) a 
charge, (b) imposed by a government, (c) on persons, entities, transactions, 
or property, (d) to yield public revenue. Moreover, intranational taxation 
displays all of the outer trappings of a tax. It is imposed under the authority 
of the government’s taxing power. The constitutional requirements for 
imposing intranational tax are likely the same as they are for imposing 
purely domestic tax, and the two are usually included within the same 
statute.71 Administration of the intranational tax regime is likely entrusted 
to the same agency that administers domestic taxation. The judicial 
remedies available to the taxpayer in the event of a disagreement with 
administrative authorities with regard to intranational taxes are likely the 
same as in the case of domestic taxes. 
However, for our purposes the significant question is not whether 
intranational taxation satisfies the legal definition of a tax but rather 
whether it functions economically as a tax. Consider, for instance, the 
economic definition of a tax, which is “a compulsory levy made by public 
authorities for which nothing is received directly in return.”72 
In other words, for a charge to constitute a tax in the substantive sense 
of the term, the payer must receive no direct quid pro quo. If the payer does 
receive a direct quid pro quo, then the payment is in fact not a tax but rather 
a fee.73 A corollary to the no direct quid pro quo condition is that taxes are 
of necessity compulsory payments. The reasoning here is simple: if the 
payment is not compulsory, then rational persons will agree to pay only 
they receive value at least as great as what they are paying in return. Note, 
however, that describing a payment as non-compulsory does not mean that 
those subject to the “tax” can choose to pay or not pay as they fit, any more 
that those who contract to purchase goods or services can choose to pay or 
not pay as they see fit. It simply means that the “taxpayer” had the choice 
not to become subject to the tax in the first place. Taxpayers who agree to 
subject themselves to the tax indicate by their behavior that the benefit that 
they receive in exchange is worth at least as much to them as what they are 
obliged to pay. 
As an example, consider the case of Pigouvian taxation (either 
domestic or supranational). In exchange for the payment, the “taxpayer” is 
                                                          
 71 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871-91 (Westlaw 2017). 
 72 SIMON JAMES & CHRISTOPHER NOBES, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 10 (12th ed. 
2012). See also HYMAN, supra note 20, at 23; ROBERT W. MCGEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 56 (2004); ROBERT E. PODOLSKY, TITANIA: THE PRACTICAL 
ALTERNATIVE TO GOVERNMENT 129-130 (2002). 
 73 See, e.g., Richard M. Bird & Thomas Tsiopoulos, User Charges for Public Services: 
Potentials and Problems, 45 CAN. TAX J. 35, 38 (1997); David G. Duff, Benefit Taxes and 
User Fees in Theory and Practice, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 391, 393 (2004); Hugh D. Spitzer, 
Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 341 (2002) (“[O]ne must 
distinguish between taxes from a legal standpoint . . . and how taxes function from an 
economic standpoint”). 
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permitted to impose costs on third parties. In fact, we have seen that the 
primary purpose of such a tax is to force market actors to consider those 
costs and to undertake the cost-imposing behavior only when the quid pro 
quo is worth more than the tax.74 This quid pro quo means that in substance 
Pigouvian taxes are not taxes but fees, and it is because of their fee-like 
nature that the traditional principles of tax theory do not apply to Pigouvian 
taxation. In particular, as we have seen, neutrality is not a value in 
adjudicating the merits of Pigouvian taxation. 75 
Foreign residents who choose to invest in a country or otherwise take 
part in its economic life subject themselves to the taxing power of the 
government of the host country. In exchange, they receive access to the host 
country’s territory, resources, and markets. In other words, the “tax” that a 
host country imposes upon foreign residents is more accurately described as 
a fee than as a tax. From the perspective of those non-residents, the tax 
imposed upon them by the host country is simply a cost of doing business 
in that country. If they believe the charge to be higher than the value 
received, they have the option of not paying the host country’s tax and 
doing business elsewhere instead.76 
A further distinction between purely domestic taxation and 
supranational taxation on the one hand and intranational taxation on the 
other concerns the relationship between the tax-imposing entity and those 
who are subject to its taxing power. With regard to both domestic and 
supranational taxation, the tax-imposing entity owes a fiduciary duty to the 
taxpaying public. Every act that it undertakes, including the imposition of 
taxation, must be justified by reference to its impact on the welfare of the 
public whom it serves. To take one example, taxes imposed for the purpose 
of supplying goods are justified if, and only if, the aggregate benefit to be 
derived from the good is greater than the aggregate cost of supplying the 
good. Moreover, in the case of purely domestic or supranational taxation, 
the tax paying entity has no legitimate independent need or desire for tax 
revenue. Consequently, there is no principle asserting that, all else being 
equal, more taxes are better than less taxes. If the public use of funds better 
promotes the welfare of the taxpaying public as a whole, then the tax is 
justified;77 otherwise it is not.78 
                                                          
 74 See PIGOU, supra note 27, at 192. 
 75 See supra Parts II.B and III.B. 
 76 See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R. 
Tillinghast Lecture - What’s Source Got to Do With it - Source Rules and U.S. International 
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 91-93 (2002). 
 77 Of course, determining the welfare of the taxpaying public as a whole can be far from 
uncontroversial, particularly when we consider the distributive effect of taxation. A tax 
scheme favored by some elements of the population may be opposed by others. However, 
given whatever social utility function is adopted by means of the legitimate operation of the 
political process, taxes are justified if, and only if, they – along with the services and transfer 
payments that they fund – promote overall societal welfare. Note that in the case of domestic 
taxation the relevant population are members of the domestic society, while in the case of 
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With regard to its intranational tax regime, the position of a 
government is entirely dissimilar. Vis-à-vis foreign investors, the 
government of the host country has a clear, independent, and justified 
desire to increase tax revenue to the extent possible. Every dollar that it 
collects from international investors is one less dollar that it has to collect 
from its own constituents, one more dollar that it can spend on promoting 
their welfare without them having to pay for it, one less dollar that it needs 
to borrow, and so forth. All else being equal, the more it can successfully 
collect from international investors, the better.79 
Furthermore, as opposed to its position vis-à-vis domestic taxpayers, 
the host country has no fiduciary duty to foreigners. The duties that it owes 
foreigners are limited to those of fair play: negotiating in good faith, 
keeping its promises, and so forth. With regard to its own residents, the 
only legitimate justification for imposing tax is that doing so promotes the 
welfare of the taxpaying public. If it does not do so, then the tax is an 
illegitimate use of sovereign power. With regard to foreigners, the only 
justification the government needs to offer as to why it is imposing tax is 
that it can. All the government needs to say – all that it implicitly does say – 
is that it would prefer that its own constituents end up with more and that 
the foreigner ends up with less.80 
                                                                                                                                      
supranational taxation the relevant population is humanity as a whole. 
 78 True, the ideal described in the text is rarely actualized, even in modern democratic 
states. Politicians and bureaucrats have interests that are not always fully aligned with those 
of the overall population. The phenomenon of governments raising funds to support or 
expand programs and bureaucracies even when there is no rational justification for their size 
or even for their existence, a phenomenon often referred to as “Leviathan,” has been much 
noted in the literature. Charles B. Blankart & David C. Ehmke, Fiscal Constitutions, 
Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN: A 
THEORIST OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 147, 148 (Richard E. Wagner 
ed., 2018); GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 1-33 (1980). Similarly, the fact that governments 
are often especially attuned to the needs of special interest groups to the determent of the 
general population is also well known. STEPHEN J. BAILEY, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS: 
THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 101 (1995). However, the agency problem faced by modern 
democracies – the misalignment of the interests of politicians and bureaucrats, on the one 
hand, and the public that they ostensibly serve on the other – does not undermine 
contemporary tax theory, any more than does the fact the well-meaning policy-makers often 
err in evaluating the consequences of their actions. The task of tax theory is to describe how 
taxes should operate, not how they do operate. In fact, it is only within an ideal paradigm of 
government operating solely for the benefit of the governed that we can critique these 
phenomena. 
 79 See, e.g., League of Nation’s Report on Double Taxation, supra note 49, at 4044 (“A 
survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how completely the Governments are 
dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner.”). This observation is as relevant today, in the 
age of tax competition, as it was a century ago. As explained in the text, what has ebbed is 
not the desire of governments to tax the foreigner, but rather their capacity to do so. 
 80 In 1775, Samuel Johnson defined a tax as “a payment exacted by authority from part 
of the community for the benefit of the whole.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, TAXATION NO TYRANNY: 
AN ANSWER TO THE RESOLUTIONS AND ADDRESS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 13 (1775). Note 
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However, the fact that the relationship between the host country and 
international investors is more akin to a contractual relationship in which 
each party attempts to promote its own interest than it is to a fiduciary 
relationship is a double-edged sword. While residents have little choice but 
to be subject to their country’s tax system – they can try to reduce their tax 
liability within the system by modifying their behavior, but they are subject 
nevertheless to the system as a whole – foreign investors have a choice.81 
As with any contractual negotiation, they can accept the terms offered by 
the other side, negotiate for better terms, or reject the offer and do business 
elsewhere. Thus, while in the domestic arena the government has fairly free 
rein to determine what it considers to be the appropriate tax structure and to 
use the sovereign power at its disposal to enforce its will, in the 
international arena its tax-imposing capacity is subject to a simple ‘no’ 
from potential taxpayers.82 Despite its desire to collect as much revenue 
from foreigners as possible, it needs to moderate its demands. 
Such being the case, what are the principles that will guide a rational 
country in designing its intranational tax regime? 
From the perspective of the host country, international investment 
entails both non-tax benefits and costs. The minimum tax that a rational 
country would be willing to accept from a foreign investor is an amount 
equal to the expected cost minus the expected benefits (net cost). Anything 
less than that and the investment will constitute a net drain on the host 
country’s resources and no rational country would agree to such a 
proposition. Note that the terms, “net cost” and “tax” may take either 
positive or negative values. Consequently, if the benefits of hosting an 
investment outweigh the costs (producing a net benefit or a negative net 
cost), the minimum tax the country would be willing to impose is a negative 
                                                                                                                                      
the limiting phrase, “from part of the community.” Id. As foreigners are not part of the 
community, it is arguable that Johnson would not include the taxation of foreigners within 
the ambit of a tax. 
 81 True, in one sense residents also have a choice. If they believe the tax burden imposed 
by their government is onerous, they have the option of emigrating (and, in the case of the 
United States, renouncing their citizenship) and thereby escaping the grip of the country’s 
tax laws. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in 
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX 
REV. 299, 309 n.18 (2001) (“[A]n expatriate’s decision not to renounce U.S. citizenship can 
be seen as evidence that the benefits of citizenship are worth facing an annual U.S. tax on 
worldwide income.”). For an interesting contrast, see Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the 
Taxation of International Income, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 146 (1998) (“Regarding 
individual taxpayers, President Clinton and members of Congress have taken steps to 
prevent wealthy U.S. taxpayers from escaping federal income tax by the simple expedient of 
giving up their U.S. citizenship.”). However, in practice individuals are much less mobile 
than is capital. Only in rare circumstances will individuals emigrate from the country in 
which they reside (and, in the case of the United States, renounce their citizenship) because 
of changes in the tax laws. Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And Yet It Moves: Taxation and Labor 
Mobility in the Twenty-First Century, 67 TAX L. REV. 169 (2014). 
 82 See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 9, at 12-15. 
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tax (i.e., a grant or a subsidy), the absolute amount of which is equal to the 
net benefit that it expects to procure. For example, assume that the net 
benefit of hosting an investment is $100. The net cost is -$100, and the 
minimum tax that the host country would be willing to accept is the same. 
In other words, it would be willing to offer grants and subsidies of up to 
$100 in order to attract the investment. 
However, imposing a tax equal to net cost (whether positive or 
negative) is far from ideal from the perspective of the host country. As 
already noted, the more that the host country can successfully collect from 
foreign residents the better. The minimum is covering costs. Beyond that 
the sky is the limit.83 The only limitation is the foreign investor’s ability to 
say ‘no,’ a scenario that would mean not only a loss of tax revenue but also 
a loss of non-tax benefits (if the investment would indeed have produced 
net non-tax benefits). 
With regards to large investments, tax is often negotiated on a case-by-
case basis. A multinational enterprise might approach a number of 
countries, ask each what it is willing to offer, negotiate terms, and then 
choose the option that offers the highest possible after-tax return.84 In terms 
                                                          
 83 At this point, a brief comparison between intranational taxation and Pigouvian tax is 
perhaps in order. We have seen that Pigouvian taxation and intranational taxation share the 
attribute of being in substance not a tax, but rather a fee, as the taxpayer receives a direct 
quid pro quo: the right to impose a cost on other members of society or access to a country’s 
territory, resources, and markets, respectively. Furthermore, we have already seen that 
neutrality is inapplicable to Pigouvian taxation and will soon see that it is inapplicable to 
intranational taxation. Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between them. 
Pigouvian taxation is still part of a country’s domestic tax regime, meaning that the 
Pigouvian taxpayers are members of the collective to which the government owes a 
fiduciary duty and whose interests it is bound to serve. Consequently, a properly constructed 
Pigouvian tax will quantify exactly the cost imposed on third parties. In other words, the 
social cost of the taxpayer’s behavior is both the minimum and the maximum of the ideal 
Pigouvian tax. In contrast, the government owes no fiduciary duty to foreign investors when 
selling access. Just covering the social cost of hosting the investment is far from an ideal 
situation from the perspective of the host country. From its perspective the more that it can 
successfully charge, the better. 
 84 See, e.g., Nov, supra note 2, at 841-82; Intel in Israel: A Fad Relationship Faces 
Criticism, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 29, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn. 
edu/article/intel-israel-old-relationship-faces-new-criticism/ (“Israel has to compete with 
other countries every few years to be the site of the next new and upgraded plant. In 2012, 
Ireland won the race to host Intel’s next generation 14-nanometer chip plant because the 
company deemed Israel’s offer of 1 billion shekels in aid as insufficient.”). The phenomenon 
exists also with regard to state and local taxation. Bill Bradley, Nike Made $25 Billion Last 
Year, Still Got a Tax Break from Oregon, NEXT CITY (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nike-had-25-billion-last-year-still-got-a-tax-break-from-
oregon (Oregon passed special legislation guaranteeing Nike’s preferential tax treatment in 
response to Nike’s threat to leave the state); Jacob Passy, This is what Amazon’s ‘HQ2’ was 
going to cost New York taxpayers, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16, 2019), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-amazons-hq2-means-for-taxpayers-in-new-york-
and-virginia-2018-11-14 (Boeing, Alcoa, Foxconn, Amazon, General Motors, Ford, Sempra 
Energy, and Nike received incentive packages of $2 billion to $8.7 billion from cities and 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:1 (2019) 
34 
of negotiating theory, the host country’s best alternative to negotiated 
agreement (BATNA) is equal to the net cost (positive or negative) of 
hosting the investment.85 The investor’s BATNA is the amount of tax that 
produces the same after-tax return as in the most attractive alternative 
venue.86 If the host country’s BATNA is higher that the investor’s BATNA 
(i.e., the least tax that the host country would agree to accept is less than the 
most that the investor would be willing to pay), then there is no zone of 
possible agreement (ZOPA),87 a fact that the negotiators will eventually 
discover. If there is a ZOPA (i.e., if the host country’s BATNA is lower 
than the investor’s BATNA), then the host country will of course attempt to 
determine and settle as close to the investor’s BATNA as possible.88 
However, case-by-case negotiation is often impractical. For example, 
assume that a lender is negotiating the terms of a loan to a resident of 
another country. It is not ordinarily practical for the lender to enter into 
simultaneous negotiations with the treasury of the borrower’s home country 
regarding the tax implications of the loan. For this reason, countries enact 
statutory intranational tax regimes, effectively offering access to all comers 
and setting forth a price for such access.89 In such instances, the dilemma 
facing the host country is analogous to that facing any other seller of goods 
or services who sets a fixed price. The higher the price, the more it will earn 
from each sale but the fewer sales it will make; the lower the price, the 
more it will sell but the less it will earn from each sale. Finding the 
appropriate balance is a matter of being aware of what other countries are 
offering and having a proper evaluation of one’s own bargaining position; 
to wit, the relative advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of 
international investors of investing in one’s country. 
The principle of neutrality has no role to play in the design of an 
                                                                                                                                      
states). 
 85 See generally, DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS: 
HOW TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES AND ACHIEVE BRILLIANT RESULTS AT THE BARGAINING 
TABLE AND BEYOND 20–23 (2007). 
 86 For instance, assume that investment in Country A offers a pretax return of 16%, that 
investment in Country B offers a pretax return of 15%, and that the minimum tax that 
County B is willing to accept is equal to 20% of the pretax return. Because the after-tax 
return in Country B is 12% (pretax return of 15% minus a 20% tax), the MNE’s BATNA is 
negotiating with Country A is a tax equal to 25% of its pretax return: with a 16% pretax 
return and a tax rate of 25%, the after-tax return from investing in Country A will be 12%, 
equal to the after-tax return in the best alternative venue. 
 87 See generally MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 85, at 23. 
 88 See generally Id. at 23-24. 
 89 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 865(a)(1) (Westlaw 2017) (effectively exempting from tax the 
gain on sale of personal property by non-resident aliens and foreign corporations); 871(a) 
(30% tax on gross FDAP income of non-resident aliens), (b) (graduated tax on taxable 
business income of non-resident aliens), (h) (exemption from tax on portfolio interest of 
non-resident aliens); 881(a) (30% tax on gross FDAP income of foreign corporations), (c) 
(exemption from tax on portfolio interest of foreign corporations); 882(a) (standard 
corporate-rate tax on business income of foreign corporations). 
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intranational tax regime, whether such a regime is negotiated on a case-by-
case basis or is imposed by statute. Neutrality posits that taxes should 
disturb investment patterns as little as possible so that capital flows to the 
same investments that it would have in the absence of taxation.90 In the 
intranational sphere, neutrality would require the host country to view the 
international investments that it would have received in the absence of 
taxation as a model and to design its intranational tax regime so as to 
disturb this ideal investment pattern as little as possible. There is no rational 
reason for a host country to adopt such a policy. If the taxes that a country 
imposes discourage investments that would have constituted a net drain on 
the country’s resources, then it is a positive phenomenon. If by means of its 
tax system a country is successfully able to woo investments that carry the 
potential of providing net after-tax benefits to residents of the host country 
(and that would otherwise have gone elsewhere), this too is a positive 
phenomenon. From the perspective of the host country, the fact that in each 
case, the host country’s intranational tax regime disturbs the investment 
pattern that would have occurred in a no-tax world is irrelevant. 
In more general terms, countries will strive to sell access to their 
territories, their resources, and their markets at the highest price that the 
market will bear, provided that the tax they receive is greater than the net 
cost of hosting the investment.91 The ideal intranational tax regime is one in 
which the sum of non-tax benefits and tax revenue from hosting 
international investment is maximized. 
A host country has no need or incentive to adopt a neutral intranational 
tax regime (i.e., one that attempts to replicate the investment patterns that 
would have prevailed in a no-tax world). It is not merely that other 
considerations are often more pressing and that neutrality must occasionally 
be sacrificed for the sake of achieving alternative goals.92 It is that 
neutrality is quite simply not a consideration at all. 
C. Inter-jurisdictional Taxation 
It is with regard to inter-jurisdictional taxation–the attempt to 
coordinate various countries’ intranational tax regimes–that the tendency to 
blur the lines separating the different types of international taxation is 
perhaps the most prevalent and the consequences of doing so the most 
egregious. A prevalent theme in the international tax literature is that while 
neutrality may not be a relevant consideration from the perspective of 
                                                          
 90 See supra Part II.A. 
 91 Recall that the terms “tax” and “net cost” can take negative values, so that when net 
cost is negative, the minimum tax will also be negative (i.e., when there is a net benefit, the 
host country will be willing to offer grants and subsidies). 
 92 In the domestic (and supranational) non-Pigouvian arena, neutrality, although an 
important goal, must often be balanced against competing goals. See text accompanying note 
26, supra. 
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individual host countries, it is a relevant consideration from a global 
perspective.93 For example, assume that Country A offers a higher pretax 
return, while Country B offers a higher after-tax return. Because what 
motivates investors is after-tax return, capital will flow to Country B even 
though–so it is claimed–the capital would be more efficiency deployed in 
Country A. Thus, one important policy objective of contemporary inter-
jurisdictional taxation is to neutralize the effect of taxes in investment 
decisions and to replicate, to the extent possible, the investment pattern that 
would have prevailed in a no-tax world.94 
True, most commentators agree that neutralizing the effect of taxation 
on international investments is not an achievable aim.95 The most 
straightforward way of removing tax as a factor in investment decisions 
would be to equalize by international convention the tax burden imposed by 
all countries on economic activity in their territories. However, any attempt 
to do so would face insurmountable theoretical and practical obstacles. 
First, it is generally recognized that countries have the sovereign right to 
determine the size of their public sector. Those that desire a relatively large 
public sector will generally impose a higher burden on the taxpaying public 
than those that prefer a relatively small private sector.96 Forcing all 
countries to equalize the tax burdens that they impose on economic activity 
in their territories in an attempt to neutralize the effect of taxation in 
international investment decisions would effectively deny them the right to 
determine the size of their government.97 Second, even if there were a 
                                                          
 93 See, e.g., GRAVELLE, supra note 1, at 4 (“A country can . . . choose a policy that leads 
to the greatest welfare for its own citizens, even if that policy distorts the allocation of 
capital (is not neutral) and leads to less efficient worldwide production. The optimal policy 
from the perspective of a country, in other words, may not be the most efficient in terms of 
the worldwide allocation of capital, and may not be the optimal policy from the perspective 
of world economic welfare.”). 
 94 See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., The Case against Deferral: A Deferential 
Reconsideration, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 385, 395-96 (1999); Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral and 
the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 589, 590 (2000); 
Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 492. 
 95 See, e.g., Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 684 (“Elimination of competition and tax 
sensitivity could be achieved if all countries adhered to principles of capital export 
neutrality. However, this would require international coordination and cooperation to a 
degree that appears overwhelmingly unattainable.”); Victor Thuronyi, International Tax 
Cooperation and a Multinational Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1642 n.8 (2001). Tax 
is not the only forum within which counties compete. See generally, e.g., Mitchell Kane & 
Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 1229 (2008). 
 96 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution 
and Tax Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371, 375, 384 (2004). For a discussion of the role 
of sovereignty in the development of tax law, see Allison Christians, Steven Dean, Diane 
Ring, & Adam Rosenzweig, Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon, 14 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 309-11 (2008). 
 97 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Crisis, supra note 2, at 1629. 
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binding international standard that required countries to impose the same 
tax rates such a standard would be ineffective without also standardizing 
the tax base.98 Assuming that the relevant measure is an income tax, this 
would mean that all countries would need to adopt identical provisions for 
determining taxable income (e.g., what is included in gross income? Which 
deductions are permissible? What is the appropriate rate of depreciation for 
every type of asset? Under what circumstances can losses be deducted?) To 
put it in the starkest terms possible, harmonization would require either that 
the rest of the world adopt Title 26 of the United States Code (not a likely 
prospect) or that the United States scrap its own Internal Revenue Code and 
adopt in its place whatever code is agreed upon by international convention 
(also not a likely prospect). Moreover, even if a standard internal revenue 
code were adopted by every country on the planet, the task would still not 
be complete. If administrative or judicial interpretation of the code varied 
from country to country, the effective tax burden would not be the same.99 
Enforcement of the common norms would also need to be standardized.100 
Because of the difficulties inherent in attempting to equalize 
international taxation and thereby remove tax as a factor in making 
international investment decisions, scholars and policy-makers tend to 
moderate their goals and instead focus on measures such as countering tax 
regimes that operate as “tax havens” or that are engaged in “harmful tax 
competition.”101 Nevertheless, these are usually viewed as compromise 
measures. Harmonization of tax regimes is ordinarily considered the 
(admittedly unattainable) Holy Grail of inter-jurisdictional taxation.102 
My argument is that such a goal is misguided. Even if it were possible 
to adopt measures that would neutralize the effect of taxation on 
international investment so that investment patterns mimicked those that 
would have prevailed in a no-tax world, such measures would actually 
                                                          
 98 Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61, S78 (2002) 
(“[T]ax rate harmonization has been accorded higher priority, despite widespread knowledge 
of the toothlessness of such proposals in the absence of tax base harmonization.”). 
 99 Jeffrey Owens, The David H. Tillinghast Lecture Tax Competition: To Welcome or 
Not?, 65 TAX L. REV. 173, 183-84 (2012). 
 100 See, e.g., Dean, supra note 7, at 139–40. 
 101 See, e.g., Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 
Concerning Taxation Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2/01) 1, 4 (EC); Dean, supra note 7, at 132-33; 
Kudrle & Eden, supra note 51, at 37–42, 46-47; Hedda Leikvang, Piercing the Veil of 
Secrecy: Securing Effective Exchange of Information to Remedy the Harmful Effects of Tax 
Havens, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293, 299 (2012); Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 
33; Rosenzweig, supra note 2, 936–42. 
 102 An alternative to harmonizing tax regimes is for home countries to impose an 
effective worldwide tax on their domestic corporations and on foreign corporations 
controlled by their domestic corporations and to permit a full credit for foreign taxes paid or 
incurred. Assuming that the domestic tax rate is no lower than the tax rate applicable in the 
countries in with the corporation operated, the effective tax burden will not be dependent 
upon the location of the corporation’s investments. See, e.g., OECD, Action 3, supra note 6. 
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misallocate capital and reduce aggregate global welfare. In the inter-
jurisdictional arena, it is not the pretax rate of return but rather the after-tax 
rate of return that is relevant for determining efficiency. In other words, in 
order to maximize aggregate global welfare, capital must flow to where the 
after-tax return is the highest. 
As we saw in our discussion of taxation in the purely domestic sphere, 
the principle of neutrality is a response to the substitution effect of non-
Pigouvian taxes. The principle posits that, all else being equal, the less the 
behavioral change precipitated by such taxes, the less the deadweight loss 
and the more efficient the tax. Therefore, if the pretax return from 
Investment A is higher than the pretax return from Investment B but the 
after-tax return from Investment B is higher than the after-tax return from 
investment A, then the anticipated flow of resources to Investment B likely 
constitutes an inefficient allocation of resources. Undertaking measures to 
encourage the flow of capital to Investment A and thereby recreating the 
investment pattern that would have occurred in a no-tax world could 
contribute to allocative efficiency.103 
On the other hand, we have seen that even within the domestic sphere, 
the principle of neutrality does not apply to Pigouvian taxation. When 
taxpayers modify their behavior in order to avoid a properly constructed 
Pigouvian tax, the substitution effect does not produce a deadweight loss, 
but actually promotes economic efficiency. In other words, with regard to 
Pigouvian taxation it is the after-tax return and not the pretax return that 
determines allocative efficiency. If the pretax return from Investment A is 
higher than that from Investment B but (after the introduction of a property 
designed Pigouvian tax) the after-tax return from Investment B is higher 
than that from Investment A, then the anticipated flow of resources to 
Investment B will promote aggregate social welfare.104 
Analytically, why is the principle of neutrality applicable to non-
Pigouvian taxation but not to Pigouvian taxation? In other words, why does 
the relative pretax return reflect allocative efficiency in the former case, 
while in the latter it is the relative after-tax return that reflects efficiency? I 
would posit that the applicability of the principle of neutrality to a given 
type of tax depends upon the relationship between the tax in question and 
the market. Non-Pigouvian taxes do not reflect either consumer preferences 
or the availability of resources. Whereas taxpayers’ pretax behavior is their 
considered response to supply and demand as expressed in the price 
structure (how much the market values what they have to offer and how 
much it values the resources that they desire), their after-tax behavior is 
skewed by the non-market effect of the tax. Consequently, the tax might 
dissuade taxpayers (whether acting in their capacity as suppliers of goods 
and services or in their capacity as consumers) from engaging in a course of 
                                                          
 103 See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. 
 104 See supra Part II.B. 
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action that would otherwise entail an efficient use of resources. This change 
of behavior — the substitution effect — is what produces the deadweight 
loss.105 
With regard to Pigouvian taxation, the situation is reversed. Because 
the market operating on its own does not account for externalities, pretax 
prices do not fully reflect consumer preferences or the availability of 
resources and, consequently, may encourage behavior that is sub-optimal 
from a societal perspective. By modifying prices to reflect the true cost of 
taxpayers’ behavior, a properly constructed Pigouvian tax forces taxpayers 
to respond to the actual supply of and the demand for resources. Thus, I 
would argue, the question of whether pretax return or post-tax return is the 
appropriate benchmark for determining efficiency is a function of whether 
the tax itself reflects supply and demand. If it does not, then pretax behavior 
is optimal. If it does, then after-tax behavior is optimal from a societal 
perspective. 
Intranational taxation is the price charged by host countries for access 
to their territory and their markets.106 The amount that they can successfully 
charge is a function of what they have to offer relative to alternative venues 
and what foreign investors need. The more the demand for what they have 
to offer and the less the supply, the higher the price that they can charge. 
Furthermore, the more the host country desires the investment the less tax it 
will demand (indeed it may adopt a negative tax - a subsidy or a grant - to 
attract the investment), while the less desirous it is of the investment the 
more it will demand as the price of access. The interplay between the needs, 
the desires, and the resources that each party brings to the table will 
determine the tax that the host country will be able to collect from foreign 
investors. Because intranational taxation reflects supply and demand, the 
pretax return represents an incomplete picture of global resources and 
preferences. Consequently, an investment pattern that responds to pretax 
return will not necessarily best promote global welfare. Efficiency requires 
that investment be allowed to flow to the place offering the highest after-tax 
return. 
As an example, assume that a corporation is considering establishing a 
manufacturing plant in one of two countries. Country P is a wealthy country 
with a developed economy. The pretax return from investing in Country P 
is 12%. However, the proposed manufacturing plant and its attendant 
activities will burden Country P’s infrastructure and lower the quality of 
life of its residents. Consequently, Country P is unwilling to allow the 
corporation to operate in its territory unless it pays a tax equal to 50% of its 
projected pretax profits. In contrast, Country Q is a relatively poor country 
with an underdeveloped economy and a primitive infrastructure. The 
                                                          
 105 See supra notes 15-17 and the accompanying text. 
 106 As already noted, from an economic perspective intranational taxes are not taxes but 
fees. See supra Part III.B. 
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proposed manufacturing plant would provide much-needed jobs that would 
stimulate the local economy, relieve social unrest, and release the 
government from some of its obligation to provide a social safety net. It 
would provide job-training and managerial experience for local residents 
and exposure to world markets. Furthermore, in order to be able to ship raw 
materials into and finished products out of the plant, the corporation will 
need to invest funds in developing the physical infrastructure in the plant’s 
vicinity. Given these advantages, Country Q is willing to allow the 
corporation to operate in its territory without paying any tax whatsoever.107 
Of course, Country Q would prefer collecting tax revenue from the 
corporation, but it is aware that should it set its price too high the 
corporation may go elsewhere and Country Q will lose the opportunity to 
host what for it is a very beneficial investment. Assume that the 
corporation’s investing in Country Q will produce a return of 8%.108 
In a tax-free world, the corporation would prefer investing in Country 
P (pretax return of 12% versus a pretax return of 8% in Country Q). 
However, given the tax differential, the corporation will likely invest in 
Country Q (after-tax return of 8% versus an after-tax return of 6% in 
Country P). Much of the international tax literature castigates this violation 
of neutrality and argues that, from a global perspective, resources are being 
used in an inefficient manner.109 The idea behind this argument is that in a 
competitive market, a higher pretax return is indicative of a more efficient 
use of resources. By directing resources away from that country in which 
the market return is the highest, the international tax structure produces 
inefficiency and reduces aggregate global welfare. 
The problem with this argument is its failure to recognize that 
intranational taxation is part and parcel of the market pricing mechanism. 
The amount that a country can charge international actors for access to its 
territory reflects the supply of and the demand for international investments 
and international investment venues. Therefore, with regard to intranational 
taxation it is the relative after-tax return, not the relative pretax return that 
determines market efficiency. In our example above, if we consider the 
benefits that the residents of Country Q would expect to reap and the cost 
that the residents of Country P would expect to bear from hosting the 
investment, we can see that establishing the plant in Country Q will better 
promote aggregate global welfare. Our source of information for this 
conclusion is the fact that, after both countries have signaled to the market - 
via their intranational tax regimes - the cost or benefit from the perspective 
of their own residents of hosting the investment, the after-tax return from 
                                                          
 107 Country Q might be willing to provide grants or subsidies (i.e., to impose a negative 
tax) in order to attract the investment. In such a case the after-tax return would be higher 
than the pretax return. 
 108 As Corporation C is not subject to tax, its pretax and after-tax return will be the same. 
 109 See, e.g., supra notes 1, 2, 7, and 34. 
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investing in Country Q is greater than the after-tax return from investing in 
Country P.110 Any inter-jurisdictional attempt to restore, in the name of 
neutrality, the investment pattern that would have prevailed in the absence 
of taxation would not only fail to promote aggregate global welfare but 
would actually be counterproductive in this regard. 
As was the case with regard to intranational taxation,111 it is not that 
neutrality is a principle that ideally would be respected in inter-
jurisdictional taxation but must be abandoned when it conflicts with other 
principles.112 There is not even a prima facie reason to presume that an 
inter-jurisdictional tax regime that respects neutrality is preferable to one 
that does not. Neutrality is simply not a proper goal of inter-jurisdictional 
taxation. 
In more universal terms, let us define the terms Yx and Cx as follows: 
(1) YX = the expected pretax income from investing in Country X, 
                                                          
 110 The text intentionally ignores international externalities and implicitly assumes either 
that the investment will not significantly affect the welfare of those living outside the host 
country or that it will produce the same effect regardless of its location. Of course, it is 
possible that, in our example, investment in Country Q will produce a greater negative 
international externality than will investing in Country P, or that investing in Country P will 
produce a greater positive international externality than will investing in Country Q, and, as 
a consequence, investing in Country P will better promote global welfare than will 
investment in Country Q. However, this is a fact-specific circumstance and in no way 
undermines the thesis of this sub-Part, namely that neutrality is inapplicable in inter-
jurisdictional taxation. True, if it could be shown that investments in countries offering a 
higher pretax return produce fewer negative international externalities or more positive 
international externalities than do investments in countries offering a higher after-tax return, 
this would lend a modicum of support to the argument that pretax return is a relevant 
consideration in promoting global welfare. However, to the best of my knowledge, no one 
has suggested that such is the case. Indeed, it appears highly unlikely that there is any 
meaningful correlation between relative pretax return and the extent of international 
externalities. Thus, while it is possible that, in a specific instance, investing in a country 
offering a higher pretax return but a lower after-tax return might constitute a more efficient 
use of global resources, it is much more likely that, over the long run, a large series of 
investments in countries offering the highest after-tax return will promote aggregate global 
welfare better than a large series of investments in countries offering the highest pretax rate 
of return. In any case, if the international community is interested in overcoming 
international externalities, the proper means of doing so would be supranational regulation 
or, even better, a supranational Pigouvian tax. It is important to note that the term, 
“international externalities,” like its domestic counterpart, does not include all effects on 
third parties, but only those effects that the market mechanism does not take into account. 
Thus, the fact that investing in one country may deprive another country of the opportunity 
to host the investment is not an externality, but is rather an effect that is fully taken into 
consideration by the market. As we have seen, if the package of taxes and incentives that a 
country can offer is insufficient to attract the investment (i.e., if the highest after-tax return 
that a country can offer is less than the after-tax return available elsewhere), then investing 
in that country will most likely not increase aggregate global welfare as much as investing in 
the country that was actually chosen to host the investment. 
 111 See supra Part III.B. 
 112 Cf. text accompanying note 26 supra. 
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(2) CX = the expected pretax net cost to Country X of hosting the 
investment. 
 
The pretax net cost of hosting an investment is the totality of the 
pretax costs that the host country expects to incur minus the totality of the 
pretax benefits that it expects to obtain from hosting the investment. If 
benefits exceed cost (i.e., if there is a positive pretax net benefit), then Cx 
will be negative. 
The over-all contribution of the investment to aggregate global welfare 
is equal to the pretax income that the investor expects to derive from the 
investment - a figure that represents consumer demand for the goods that it 
produces, the availability of labor and capital, and so forth - minus the costs 
that the host country will incur in hosting the investment. Thus, 
 
(3) (YX – CX) = the contribution to aggregate global welfare of selecting 
Country X as an investment venue.113 
 
As we have noted, the minimum tax that a rational country will agree 
to accept in order to host an international investment is equal to the net cost 
of hosting the investment (if the net cost is negative then the minimum tax 
will also be negative, i.e., the maximum that it would agree to pay would 
equal the net benefits that it expects to obtain from hosting the investment). 
Thus, 
 
(4) CX = the minimum tax that Country X will demand to host the 
investment. 
 
Seeing as YX is the expected pretax income from investing in Country 
X, while Cx is the minimum tax that Country X will demand: 
 
(5) (YX – CX) = the maximum possible after-tax income from investing 
in Country X. 
 
Applying statement (3), we know that for any two countries P and Q: 
 
(6) If (YQ – CQ) > (YP – CP), then the contribution to aggregate global 
                                                          
 113 Alternatively, we can define BX as the expected pretax net benefit (benefits minus 
costs) of hosting the investment. As Bx = -Cx, the contribution to aggregate global welfare can 
be described as. Mathematically, the two expressions (YX – CX and YX + Bx) are identical. For 
the sake of consistency, the text will simply use the term CX, which can take either positive 
or negative values. 
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welfare of investing in Country Q is greater that the contribution to 
aggregate global welfare of investing in Country P. 
 
Furthermore, applying statement (5), we know that for any two 
countries P and Q: 
 
(7) If (YQ – CQ) > (YP – CP), then the maximum possible after-tax 
income from investing in Country Q is greater than the maximum 
possible after-tax income from investing in Country P. 
 
 Comparing statements (6) and (7), we can see that the country able 
to offer the higher after-tax return is the investment venue that would better 
promote aggregate global welfare. In contrast, the fact that YP > YQ offers 
no indication that (YP – CP) > (YQ – CQ). In other words, the fact that one 
country is able to offer a higher pretax return offers no indication that 
investing in that country will constitute a more efficient allocation of 
resources.114 
                                                          
 114 The text does not consider the distribution of the efficiency bonus that arises from the 
choice of Country Q as an investment venue. The thesis of this subpart is that an efficient 
allocation of global resources requires capital to flow to those venues offering the highest 
after-tax rate of return, not to those offering the highest pretax rate of return. The question of 
who will benefit from the efficiency bonus is beyond the parameters of our current 
discussion. However, in very encapsulated terms, let us assume that 
(8) (YQ – CQ) > (YP – CP) > (YR – CR), where R represents any venue other than Country P 
and Country Q. 
In other words, Country Q has to potential to offer the highest after-tax return and Country P 
has the potential to offer the second highest rate of return. In such a case, the most that the 
investor will be willing to pay to Country Q is the amount that would make the after-tax 
return in Country Q equal to the after-tax return from investing in Country P. Algebraically, 
the most that the investor would be willing to pay Country P is 
 (9) YQ – (YP – CP). 
To see why this is so, recall that the pretax income in Country Q is YQ. If the tax imposed by 
Country Q is YQ – (YP – CP), then the after-tax return would be YQ – [YQ – (YP – CP)]. This 
equals YP – CP, which is the after-tax return in Country P, the next best alternative. In other 
words, the investor’s indifferent point is when Country Q tax is YQ – (YP – CP). Any higher 
and the investor will prefer Country P; any less and the investor will prefer Country Q. 
Consequently, Country Q’s BATNA is CQ, while the investor’s BATNA is YQ – (YP – CP). 
See supra note 86 and the accompanying text. From (8), we know that CQ < YQ – (YP – CP), 
meaning that the minimum tax Country Q will take is less than the maximum tax that the 
investor will pay. The area between those points represents the ZOPA. See supra note 85 at 
23 and the accompanying text. Unless one or both parties incorrectly estimate the other 
side’s BATNA or engage in an ultimately self-destructive game of chicken, a deal will be 
struck somewhere within that zone. The exact point within the ZOPA where the deal will be 
struck depends upon all of the facts and circumstances, including the negotiating skills of 
those representing the two sides, the political and economic pressures that both parties they 
face, and so forth. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The discourse with regard to international taxation is fraught with 
conceptual confusion. First, there is a tendency among scholars and policy-
makers in the field of international taxation to rely upon concepts that were 
developed within the context of domestic taxation, without a thorough 
examination of their applicability to the international arena. Second, there is 
a tendency to lump together a number of very distinct types of tax regimes 
under the category of international taxation, which fails to recognize that 
the principles of tax theory relevant to each are also different. 
One theorem underlying domestic tax theory is that allocative 
efficiency can be achieved only when capital flows to those investments 
offering the highest pretax return. When investments with a relatively low 
pretax return are able to offer a relatively high after-tax return, capital will 
be misdirected and resources will not be used in the most efficient manner. 
The principle of neutrality posits, therefore, that taxes should not change 
investment patterns and that those investment opportunities that would have 
attracted capital in the absence of taxation should continue to attract capital 
following the imposition of tax. 
However, even within the domestic sphere, the principle of neutrality 
is not universally valid. With regard to Pigouvian taxes, it is not the pretax 
but rather the after-tax return that determines efficiency. If, following the 
imposition of a properly designed Pigouvian tax, investments that offer a 
relatively high pretax return now offer a relatively low after-tax return, the 
expected change in investment decisions will increase aggregate societal 
welfare. The fact that such investments offer a relatively high pretax return 
but a relatively low after-tax return merely indicates that the activity 
concerned imposes a cost on third parties, a cost for which the market 
operating on its own does not account. 
Moving to the international arena, the principles that would apply to a 
hypothetical supranational tax are similar to those of domestic tax theory. 
Here, too, non-Pigouvian taxes should be designed to be as neutral as 
possible, while the principle of neutrality would inapplicable for Pigouvian 
taxes (such as a tax on carbon emissions). As in the domestic sphere, 
allocative efficiency is determined by pretax return in the case of non-
Pigouvian taxes and by after-tax return in the case of Pigouvian taxation. 
However, most of the discourse in the field of international law 
concerns not supranational taxation, but rather intranational and inter-
jurisdictional taxation. Nevertheless, perhaps because it describes all three 
under the catchall phrase of international taxation, it fails to recognize that 
while the principles of domestic taxation would be applicable to a 
hypothetical supranational tax regime, they are inappropriate in the context 
of intranational and inter-jurisdictional taxation. 
When designing its intranational tax regime, there is no reason for a 
host country to consider as its point of reference the international 
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investments that it would have hosted in the absence of taxation and to 
attempt to duplicate that pattern in the after-tax world. Rather it will attempt 
to use its tax laws, among other measures, to attract investments that are 
likely to promote the interests of its constituents and to deter investments 
that are likely to be detrimental to those interests. Whether such 
investments would have occurred in a world without tax is not a relevant 
consideration. The principle that will guide countries in designing their 
intranational tax regime is the desire to maximize the total benefit (i.e., the 
non-tax benefit plus the tax revenue) from hosting international 
investments. 
With regard to inter-jurisdictional taxation, the key point is that 
because intranational tax is in substance a fee that host countries charge for 
access to their territory, it is part and parcel of the market mechanism and 
reflects the supply of and the demand for international investments and 
international investment venues. Therefore, an efficient allocation of global 
resources requires that capital be directed to those investments that offer the 
highest after-tax return. An inter-jurisdictional tax regime that successfully 
neutralized the effect of intranational taxation in international investment 
decisions — a cherished goal of the international tax literature — would in 
fact create allocative efficiency and reduce aggregate global welfare. 
If the international tax dialogue were focused on the design of a (non-
Pigouvian) supranational tax regime, then neutrality would properly play a 
central role in the discourse. However, discussions of cross-country 
cooperation to establish a modern “international tax regime” are almost 
always concerned with inter-jurisdictional taxation. Here the principle of 
neutrality not only has no legitimate role to play but would, if implemented, 
be counterproductive to the very interests that it purportedly promotes. 
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